



he conventional wisdom among
social advocacy groups, the left and
the media about what has happened
to Canada’s social programs in the 1980s
and 1990s goes like this: “Empowered by
an unholy blend of neoconservative ideolo-
gy and governments’ political success in
convincing most Canadians of the econom-
ic imperative of putting the nation’s fiscal
house in order, the corporate and ruling
political/bureaucratic elites have slashed
social spending and shrivelled the role of
the federal government in social policy.
While the provinces have played an impor-
tant part — in some cases enthusiastically,
in others regretfully — in the assault on
social programs, the chief culprit is the fed-
eral government: Ottawa abandoned the
sacred trust of universality, abrogated its
stewardship role in enforcing national stan-
dards and unilaterally pulled out of the
cooperative federalism partnership where-
by it had helped the provinces finance
medicare, welfare, social services and post-
secondary education.”
As with all influential mythologies,
there are important elements of truth in this
account. But on the whole it is a comic book
version of the ongoing transformation of the
Canadian welfare state. As a result, the so-
called public discourse on social policy in this
country is lacking in substance and subtlety, a
fact that serves to insulate governments from
effective criticism and starve the country of
badly needed informed debate about how to
reconstruct our social security system.
Important advances in social policy which hold
out promise for broader reform are being
ignored — indeed, opposed — by “civil socie-
ty” groups that cling to an outmoded univer-
salist model of social security that in some
important respects never was realized in Canada.
This paper analyses the ongoing trans-
formation of income security policy in
Canada by attempting to: (1) chart trends in
major income security expenditures and their
impact on income inequality; (2) identify key
economic, social, demographic and political
forces driving the recent and unfolding
reform of Canadian income security policy;
(3) explore major developments in income





































































Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 183rity expenditures indicate a modest rather than
sharp downward trend in both absolute and
relative terms. Moreover, while comprehensive
data on total overall social security spending
are available only to 1996-97 (Human
Resources Development Canada), reductions
in income security and social services have
outweighed those in health and education.
Total federal and provincial/territorial
expenditures on income security programs
increased from $50.9 billion in 1980-81 to a
peak of $93.4 billion in 1992-93, declining
to $86.5 billion in 1997-98 though inching
up to $87.3 billion in 1998-99 (the latest
year for which comprehensive data are avail-
able). Chart 1 shows the trend; here, as in
other graphs, dollar figures are shown in con-
stant 2000 dollars.
While federal and provincial income
security spending trends are similar, the lat-
ter show a steeper rise and fall. Provincial
income security spending rose by 123.8 per-
cent in real terms between 1980-81 and
1993-94 as opposed to 70.4 percent for fed-
eral income security expenditures; provincial
spending declined by 13.2 percent from
184
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passing both direct and tax-delivered bene-
fits) since the mid-1980s; and (4) explain
how governments have effected such signifi-
cant restructuring with relatively little polit-
ical pain. Regarding the latter task, I coin the
term “relentless incrementalism” to charac-
terize the dominant process and method of
deconstructing and reconstructing Canadian
social policy.
This paper focuses on income security
programs, which constitute the bulk of fed-
eral social spending and a significant portion
of provincial social expenditure. But its argu-
ments and themes apply to the reform of
social policy generally, including social serv-
ices, employment programs and health care.
INCOME SECURITY EXPENDITURES
AND INEQUALITY 
Trends in Major Income Security
Programs
Although the 1990s are widely viewed
to be a decade of cuts to public spending,
especially social programs, in fact income secu-
CHART 1
Total Government (Federal, Provincial and
Municipal) Income Security Expenditures,
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Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 1841993-94 to 1998-99 as opposed to only 3.8
percent for the federal government.
The trend is similar when measured in
per capita terms to take into account popu-
lation increase. Chart 2 shows that total fed-
eral-provincial income security expenditures
went from $2,076 in 1980-81 to $3,266 in
1992-93 and declined to $2,885 by 1998-99
— though the latter is still above the figures
for the 1980s.
The recent decline is somewhat more
pronounced when we compare income secu-
rity spending to GDP, as illustrated in Chart
3. Total federal-provincial income security
expenditures rose from 8.2 percent of GDP
1980-81 to 9.8 percent in 1982-83 (reflect-
ing the recession, which boosted social
spending and reduced GDP) and a peak of
11.9 percent in 1992 (again, reflecting the
impact of the recession on spending and
GDP), though it has since fallen steadily, to
9.4 percent in 1998-99, as income security
spending fell and GDP rose in real terms
between 1994-95 and 1997-98 (though
income security expenditures rose a bit
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between 1997-98 and 1998-99). Compared
to total government expenditures, though,
the trend was upwards in the 1980s to a
plateau in the 1990s, with small ups and
downs — from 19.4 percent in 1980-81 to
26.7 percent in 1993-94 and 26.1 percent in
1998-99 (see Chart 3).
Both levels of government also deliver
substantial income benefits through the per-
sonal income tax system by means of a welter
of non-refundable credits and deductions that
reduce income tax or (in the case of refund-
able credits) also deliver cash benefits to those
below the taxpaying threshold. Chart 4 gives
the trends for income security direct and tax
expenditures for 1988-89 through 1998-99
(consistent and comprehensive data for earli-
er years are not available). Expenditures
increased from an estimated $121.5 billion in
1988-89 to $149.1 billion in 1994-95,
declining somewhat to $140.1 billion in
1998-99. In 1998-99 direct expenditures rep-
resented 62.3 percent of overall income secu-
rity expenditures while tax expenditures came
to 37.7 percent.
CHART 3
Total Government (Federal, Provincial and
Municipal) Income Security Expenditures as
Percent of GDP and Total Spending, 
1980-81 to 1998-99 
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Municipal) Direct and Tax Expenditures on
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increased in the first half of the 1980s (from
$4.1 billion to $5.0 billion in 1985-86) but
has remained more or less at the same level
ever since ($5.0 billion in 1998-99) due to
progress in the retirement income of elderly
Canadians — resulting largely from the mat-
uration of the Canada and Quebec pension
plans, improvements in private pension
plans, the rising participation of women in
the paid labour force and the retirement of
Canadians who enjoyed substantial real wage
gains in their working years. For the same
reasons, the smallest of the three programs,
Spouses Allowance (for low-income widowed
and married people between 60 and 64), has
declined steadily in cost since the mid-1980s
and amounted to just $382.9 million in
1998-99 (as opposed to total elderly expen-
ditures of $23.7 billion).
Two of the same factors — the rising
participation of women in the paid labour
force and population aging — are fuelling
big increases in expenditures on the Canada
Pension Plan. Chart 5 shows that CPP out-
lays escalated from $4.3 billion in 1980-81
to $19.2 billion in 1998-99 — a hefty 346.5
percent real increase, far outpacing the 48.1
percent real rise in spending on elderly ben-
efits. Another, though lesser factor, is
enhancements in benefits over the years. No
other income security program, federal or
provincial (with the exception of the parallel
Quebec Pension Plan, which is growing rap-
idly for the same reasons as the CPP), has
expanded so much and so relentlessly. While
new CPP recipients will experience a small
reduction in their benefits as a result of
recent changes, the effect on expenditures
will be swamped by the burgeoning caseload.
Note that the Canada and Quebec plans pro-
186
Ken Battle
To explain these patterns in income
security expenditures, it is necessary to exam-
ine individual trends in their constituent pro-
grams. Chart 5 plots the trends. We begin
with federal income security programs and
then turn to those delivered by the provinces
(and, in a few cases, municipalities).
Elderly benefits — Old Age Security,
the Guaranteed Income Supplement and
Spouses Allowance — constitute the largest
federal income security expenditures. Chart 5
illustrates the relentless upward increase; total
expenditures rose from $16.0 billion in 1980-
81 to $23.7 billion in 1998-99 and will reach
a projected $26.2 billion by 2003-04.
The program driving this upward
trend is OAS, by far the largest of the three
benefits, which the steady aging of Canada’s
population has pushed from $11.5 billion in
1980-81 to $18.3 billion in 1998-99. As
will be explained later, OAS remains a quasi-
universal program despite its shift to income
testing in 1991 (only the top 2 percent of
seniors do not qualify for any benefits).
CHART 5
Federal Income Security Program
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vide not only retirement benefits, but also
survivor, disability and death payments.
Unemployment/Employment Insur-
ance expenditures have had a roller-coaster
ride over the years. They jumped from $9.8
billion in 1980-81 to $16.8 billion in 1982-
83 (a 71.4 percent real hike) as a result of ris-
ing unemployment during the recession of
the early 1980s (from 7.5 percent in 1980 to
11.3 percent in 1984). Costs eased slowly
with economic recovery, but rose even more
sharply with the early 1990s deep recession’s
high unemployment: the jobless rate went
from 8.1 percent in 1980 to 11.4 percent in
1993, pushing UI outlays up to $21.7 bil-
lion in 1992-93. They then plunged to $12.5
billion by 1998-99 and are projected to
increase slightly (due to a relaxation of the
rules reducing benefits for frequent users and
doubling of parental leave duration) in the
early years of this century.
Two factors explain the ski-jump fall in
U/EI costs in the first half of the 1990s. The
first is a series of belt-tightening changes in
eligibility requirements and the amount and
duration of benefits, sealed with the
Orwellian name change to Employment
Insurance in July 1996. The second is falling
unemployment, from 11.4 percent in 1993
to 6.8 percent in 2000. The number of recip-
ients of regular EI benefits was almost cut in
half (by 48 percent) from 1992-93
(1,148,290) to 1998-99 (552,975); during
the same period the number of unemployed
Canadians fell by only 20 percent. Coverage
of the unemployed nosedived from 74 per-
cent in 1989 to 36 percent in 1997.
Federal child benefits remained more
or less flat between 1980-81 and 1998-99 at
around $6 billion, as depicted in Chart 5.
However, under the federal-provincial
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National Child Benefit reform, Ottawa is
substantially increasing its expenditures on
the broad-based income-tested Canada Child
Tax Benefit and has solidified its increases by
fully indexing rates and income thresholds.
By 2004-05, expenditures are projected to
reach $7.75 billion (in inflation-adjusted
2000 dollars). Moreover, the number of fam-
ilies with children eligible for the CCTB will
increase from about 80 percent to more than
95 percent by 2004-05 because of increases
in the base Child Tax Benefit and the latter’s
threshold for maximum payments.
The federal government delivers
income benefits to veterans through two pro-
grams — pensions for those with a service-
related disability (and survivor benefits for
their widowed spouses and children) and
income-tested allowances. Combined bene-
fits from the two programs declined from
$1.75 billion in 1980-81 to $1.25 billion in
1998-99 as the eligible population shrank
due to the death of veterans from the world
wars and the Korean war. Ottawa also funds
social assistance to Aboriginals on reserves.
Expenditures climbed steadily from $305.9
million in 1980-81 to $630.8 million in
1994-95, dipped for the next few years but
rebounded to $618.4 million in 1998-99.
The individual program expenditure
trends reviewed above reveal why federal
income security spending overall rose steadi-
ly throughout the 1980s and decreased only
modestly in the 1990s to begin climbing
again in 1998-99. Overall elderly benefits and
the CPP have risen steadily over the years: in
1980-81 they represented 53.0 percent of total
federal direct income security expenditures; by
1998-99, they had swollen to 67.8 percent of
the total. These increased expenditures
swamped the sizeable reduction in EI expen-
Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 187ditures in the 1990s, which shrank from 29.7
percent of total federal income security  spend-
ing in 1990-91 to 19.8 percent by 1998-99.
Changes in veterans’ income benefits (which
fell) and social assistance for reserves (which
increased) had little impact since they repre-
sent a small proportion of the total — 2 per-
cent for veterans’ programs and 1 percent for
aboriginal social assistance. Chart 6 compares
the trends for the major categories.
Turning to provincial spending, Chart
7 shows the trends in major programs. Far
and away the largest item is provincial and
municipal expenditures on social assistance
(“welfare”). The recession of the early 1980s
bumped up social assistance outlays, but they
continued to grow throughout the decade
despite declining unemployment from 1983
through 1989, increasing from $5.9 billion
in 1980-81 to $9.4 billion in 1989-90.
Why? The answer lies largely in changes in
the labour market and society.
Welfare originally was intended to be
Canada’s social program of last resort, pro-
viding short-term, emergency assistance to
“unemployable” households with no other
source of income. Instead, it has grown into a
major front-line social program that in 1994
served 3.1 million women, children and men
— 13 percent of the non-elderly population,
which is a record high. Many recipients are
“employable” men and women who are
chronically unemployed, cycling among non-
standard jobs, EI and welfare. Four in 10
Canadians dependent on social assistance are
children. The high rate of marriage break-
down and the increasing number of young
mothers choosing to raise their children alone
rather than give them up for adoption are
another cause of increasing welfare rolls. So
also is de-institutionalization, which has
moved many people with physical and men-
tal disabilities from institutions to welfare.
Rising unemployment with the reces-
sion of 1991-92 added to these forces and
pushed social assistance expenditures from
$9.4 billion in 1989-90 to $15.8 billion in
1993-94 and 1994-95. However, social assis-
tance expenditures fell in the latter half of the
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CHART 7
Provincial and Municipal Income Security
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played a role, but the stronger factors were
governmental — reductions in welfare ben-
efits (through overt cuts, as in Alberta and
Ontario, or stealthily through non-indexa-
tion) and tightening of eligibility rules.
While anti-welfare ideology and politics
clearly played a role in Alberta and Ontario,
cuts in federal social transfers clearly helped
motivate provincial belt-tightening of social
assistance programs.
The QPP now ranks second in provin-
cial income security spending, and it has seen
steady and sizeable increases for the same rea-
sons noted earlier concerning the CPP. Quebec
Pension Plan outlays rose from $1.5 billion in
1980-81 to $5.7 billion in 1998-99.
Provincial refundable tax credit expen-
ditures have increased over the years as well,
though they have not followed a smooth pat-
tern. They remained more or less flat through-
out the 1980s (though they were higher at the
start of the decade) and then increased in the
1990s with some ups and downs, standing at
just under $4.0 billion in 1998-99.
Finally, Workers’ Compensation expend-
itures also increased during the 1980s and
the first two years of the 1990s, though they
have declined since 1992. Going from $1.9
billion in 1980-81, they peaked at $4.3 bil-
lion in 1992-93 and declined to an esti-
mated $3.6 billion in 1998-99. The fall in
expenditures in recent years is mainly the
result of a sharp decline in the number of
injured workers or their dependants receiv-
ing benefits, which fell from a high of
614,336 in 1988-89 to a low of 399,542
in 1997-98. Provinces have responded to
rapidly rising costs by reducing access to
and levels of benefits (Gunderson and
Hyatt 2000).
189
Relentless Incrementalism: Deconstructing and 
Reconstructing Canadian Income Security Policy
While provincial income security
expenditures increased overall between 1980-
81 and the early 1990s, showing the same
pattern as federal spending, provincial income
spending fell more sharply in the rest of the
decade. Between 1993-94 and 1998-99,
provincial income security expenditures went
down by 13.2 percent in real terms, or $3.7
billion, whereas federal income programs
together declined by only 3.8 percent, or $2.5
billion. Only the QPP consistently increased,
whereas both elderly benefits and the CPP
keep driving up federal income security
expenditures. The largest provincial income
program, social assistance, fell significantly,
and Workers’ Compensation also declined.
Provincial tax credit spending rose in 1998-
99, but not enough to counter the continued
fall of welfare and Workers’ Compensation
expenditures.
Narrowing the Inequality Gap
Canada’s income security system has
performed remarkably well over the years in
narrowing the income gap between the afflu-
CHART 8
Gap Between Income Shares of Families in
Top and Bottom Quintiles, for Market, After-

































Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 189changes — economic (fiscal and labour mar-
ket), social, demographic and political.
Economic factors, while primus inter pares, are
a necessary but insufficient explanation for
the shift from a “universalist” to “post-wel-
fare” state in Canada that began in the late
1970s, gathered steam in the 1980s and
1990s, and is still under way in the first
decade of the 21st century. Social, demo-
graphic, political and ideological changes and
forces, often interacting with economic fac-
tors, are playing a major role in the ongoing
transformation of Canadian social policy. So
also is the role of ideas about social policy;
the universalist model of social security that
legitimized and guided (though only partly)
the construction of the post-war welfare state
is being supplanted by a “post-welfare state”
model that is both shaping and reflecting
changes to major social programs (Banting
1997; Banting and Battle 1994; Battle and
Torjman 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Giddens
1998; Human Resources Development
Canada 1994; Kent 1962, 1999; Marsh
1985; Mendelson 1993, 1999; Prince 1999;
Torjman 1997a).
Economic Factors
Without question, governments’ —
especially Ottawa’s — fiscal woes have been
the main driver for changes to Canadian social
policy in the latter part of the 20th century
and into the first decade of the 21st century.
The post-war growth of Canada’s social
security system was fuelled by an expanding
economy, which burbled along at a healthy
5.6 percent annual average real rate of
increase during the 1950s and 1960s, allow-
ing governments to collect more money than
they spent and still afford rapidly rising
social expenditures resulting from major new
Ken Battle
ent and the poor and in combating growing
inequality in market incomes (i.e., income
from employment, investments, private pen-
sions and other non-public sources). Chart 8
shows the trends in the ratio of the share of
income of families in the top quintile to the
share for families in the bottom quintile. We
look at three definitions of income — mar-
ket income, after-transfer income (i.e., mar-
ket sources plus government income security
benefits) and after-tax income (i.e., after fed-
eral and provincial income taxes affect the
distribution of after-transfer income)
(Statistics Canada 2000).
Market income inequality grew with
the deep recession of 1990-91, eased some-
what with economic recovery but rose again
in 1998, when families in the highest quintile
had 14.6 times the share of market income of
families in the lowest quintile. However,
income security benefits — even though key
programs suffered large cuts (e.g., EI and wel-
fare) — managed to substantially narrow the
income gap and almost completely countered
increases in market income inequality. The
income tax system also has a redistributive
effect, further narrowing the gap between
affluent and poor. However, after-tax and
transfer income inequality crept up during the
1990s as a result mainly of growing market
income inequality and, to a lesser extent, cuts
to transfers. In 1989, families in the top quin-
tile had 4.9 times the share of after-tax income
of those in the bottom quintile, but by 1998
that ratio had increased to 5.5 times.
FORCES FOR CHANGE
Pressures to reform Canada’s social pro-
grams have arisen out of a variety of profound
190
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a sea change in Canada’s economic fortunes
in the mid-1970s marked the end of post-
war expansion and the beginning of the end
of the universalist welfare state — even
though it would take another decade before
the federal government summoned up the
political courage to dismantle the supposed-
ly sacred trust of universal social programs
and reduce and recast its financial support for
provincial health and welfare systems. Under
a failed large-canvas federal-provincial reform
of social policy between 1973 and 1975, a
federal proposal to supplement the incomes
of the working poor was withdrawn because
of the finance department’s concern about its
future cost. Canada’s economic growth began
to sputter with the world oil price shock and
the rise of a bitter mixture of low growth and
high inflation.
Mounting government deficits and
accumulating debt pushed the federal and
provincial governments increasingly to
restrain public — especially social — spend-
ing in the 1980s and 1990s. The forces of
social policy reform-through-restraint gath-
ered strength as Ottawa managed to convince
most Canadians that the deficit had to be
cured no matter how bitter the medicine.
There is no question that the Liberal govern-
ment’s successful war on the deficit — waged
through a combination of spending cuts and
tax increases, including hidden “stealth”
measures to erode benefits and creep taxes
upward — was the primary impetus for
social policy reform in the 1980s and 1990s.
The clear relationship between fiscal
and social policy change is illustrated in
Chart 9, which compares trends in the feder-
al surplus/deficit and in total government
(federal, provincial and municipal) social
spending in the post-war period and lists
major social program changes. From 1946-
47 to the mid-1970s, Ottawa balanced its
books yet built most of the superstructure of
the universalist welfare state. Unemployment
Insurance, created in 1940, slowly grew in
scope until, in 1971, a new Act (new UI)
covered virtually the entire paid workforce.
Family Allowances paid its first benefits in
the spring of 1945. Old Age Security, serv-
ing all Canadians 65 and older, arrived in
1952. A series of other major social programs
followed (delivered by Ottawa or by the
provinces with federal financial assistance) —
hospital insurance, medical insurance, cost-
shared welfare, the Vocational Rehabilitation
Disability Program, the Canada and Quebec
pension plans (C/QPP), the GIS, federal sup-
port for training and student loans, the
Spouses Allowance, an expanded Family
Allowances (new FA) and the refundable
Child Tax Credit (CTC).
But the 1980s and 1990s brought
deepening deficits and resulting retrenchment
(though varying in bite from minor to major)
in several major social programs, including
191
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Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 191child benefits, elderly benefits, federal social
transfers to the provinces (for health, post-sec-
ondary education, social assistance and social
services), social housing, welfare, U/EI and
the CPP. (These changes will be discussed
later.) The NCB in 1998 marked the first
“new” social expenditure in many years and
was followed by an early childhood develop-
ment agreement under which Ottawa will
provide (effectively restore, in part) financial
support to help provinces build early child-
hood development services.
Note that, even with the reductions
imposed on major social programs in the
1980s and 1990s, social spending continued
to grow in real terms, declining modestly in
the mid-1990s. As explained above, the
main reason is the upward march of expen-
ditures on the biggest public pension pro-
grams (OAS and C/QPP), which were only
slightly trimmed by governments. This is a
crucial finding: government restraint meas-
ures, bolstered by an improving economy,
served only to slow and finally modestly
reverse the upward curve of social spending.
Given the pressure of an aging population
and recent enhancements to federal child
benefits, the future trend of social spending
likely will plateau if not even increase, not
continue its recent decline.
Changes in the labour market also pose
daunting challenges for educational, employ-
ment and income security policy.
Canada’s long retreat from any sem-
blance of a full-employment economy — the
latter constituting the bedrock of the uni-
versalist model of social security — has been
one of the heaviest pressures on the welfare
state. Rising unemployment placed growing
demands on welfare, UI, social and employ-
ment services, health care and other social
programs. To make matters worse, mass
unemployment robbed federal and provincial
treasuries of badly needed tax revenues,
resulting in hikes in income taxes, consump-
tion taxes and payroll taxes.
Canada’s official unemployment rate
has fallen considerably in recent years, from
its recessionary peak of 11.4 percent in 1993
to 6.8 percent in 2000. But unemployment
remains a serious problem, especially if we
look at the “real” unemployment rate — that
is, counting those who have given up an
active job search or are working part-time
because they cannot find full-time work —
or half as much again as the official figure. In
2000 there were still more than a million
Canadians (1,089,600) out of work, and the
age-old problem remains of regions and com-
munities afflicted by chronic joblessness and
much higher rates than the national average.
Like that of the United States, Canada’s
labour market has undergone polarization
(Jackson and Robinson 2000). There is a core
of good jobs requiring advanced education
and specialized skills in return for good pay,
career advancement, and generous pension
and other work-related benefits. At the same
time, there is a “non-standard” labour mar-
ket for part-time, seasonal and temporary
employees, the self-employed and people
who hold down multiple jobs. Its character-
istics are the opposite of those of the core
workforce — low skills, poor pay for many,
instability, few if any work-related benefits
such as supplementary health care and dim
career prospects.
There is evidence of earnings polariza-
tion, with growth in both lower-paid and
higher-paid jobs, and shrinkage of middle-
income employment. The latter includes
many well-paid blue-collar jobs in tradition-
192
Ken Battle
Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 192al industries, such as manufacturing and
transportation, which have been victims of
technological change. Middle-management
positions have been cut in the downsizing of
public and private bureaucracies. Canada is
also experiencing growing polarization of
working time. Hours of work are increasing
for some full-time workers who tend to have
high incomes. At the same time, there has
been a growth of part-time work, much of it
involuntary and most paying low earnings.
And education — always a strong correlate
of occupational and social status — is anoth-
er form of polarization, with post-secondary




Social and demographic changes —
and their attendant cost effects — also are
buffeting Canada’s social security system.
The archetypical “Wally-and-the-Beaver”
family of the 1950s and 1960s — dad in
the labour force, mom (working) at home,
three children — has been transformed by
profound changes in the economy, society
and culture.
A growing number of Canada’s fami-
lies feel insecure and vulnerable. Many have
had to turn to social safety net programs like
UI and social assistance for support at the
very time that governments have been cut-
ting back on those programs.
One of the most significant changes
in the family arises from the dramatic
increase in women’s participation in the
paid labour force since the 1960s. In seven
out of every 10 couples with children, both
parents work outside the home. Nearly two
thirds of married women with children
under age six are in the labour force. The
majority of single parents are now in the
labour force as well.
Not only are most parents employed,
but an increasing number are working
longer hours on the job in order to make
ends meet. They have less time for house-
work, shopping and the other domestic
labour required to maintain a household —
not to mention time to spend with their
children. Juggling the dual and sometimes
conflicting demands of their responsibilities
as workers and parents is a stressful and tir-
ing daily struggle for most parents. The
burden is especially hard on mothers, who
continue to shoulder most of the responsi-
bility for child care and housework.
Another major stress on today’s fami-
lies is the high rate of marriage breakdown
and remarriage. Canada has one of the high-
est divorce rates in the world, along with
Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom.
Four in 10 marriages end in divorce, though
seven in 10 divorced Canadians marry again.
More and more parents and children have to
adjust to life in “blended” families from two
previous marriages.
Divorce and separation also create sin-
gle-parent families. One out of every five
families with children is now headed by a
single parent, usually the mother. Single par-
ents not only have to carry most, if not all, of
the burden of caring and providing for their
children. They also run a high risk of pover-
ty. More than half of single-parent families
led by women live on low incomes and many
end up on welfare, although the majority of
single parents work in the labour force, typ-
ically in low-wage jobs.
Families are smaller today; most have
only one or two children. Unlike earlier
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Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 193generations, they cannot rely upon older
children to help take care of their younger
siblings. Families also move more often, so
many are isolated from traditional support
networks of relatives.
These social changes are placing heavy
demands on Canada’s social programs —
welfare, child care, child welfare and health
care — that were not built for the world of
the 1990s and 2000s. An added stress is the
aging of the population, which will place
increasing pressure on the pension system,
social services and health care as the baby
boom generation reaches old age.
Moreover, these demographic, social
and economic forces are additive and inter-
active. Divorce, unemployment and low
earnings threaten to condemn a growing
number of Canadians to poverty in old age.
Child poverty brings an above-average risk
of a range of health problems, accidents and
below-average school performance. These
risks can work against poor children when
they reach adulthood, resulting in a greater
likelihood of unemployment and low wages,




Political and ideological changes also
have motivated and moulded changes to
social policy and challenged the universalist
model. The Keynesian-inspired civil servants
and politicians who designed and built the
post-war welfare state are long retired or
dead. They have been succeeded by typically
neoconservative bureaucrats, especially those
in the federal Department of Finance, which
has dominated social policy over the past two
decades. Both corporate and political elites
in Canada have proved more conservative
than the general population, and are more
supportive of cuts to social spending.
The major social policy changes made
by the Conservative government in the
1980s built a momentum that prepared the
way for even more radical changes by the
Liberals in the 1990s and into the new
century (Battle and Torjman 1995). The
Conservatives proved that the universalist
welfare state was no longer a “sacred trust,”
if it ever had been. Polls taken for the Liberal
government’s Social Security Review in 1994
and 1995 found that a majority of Canadians
believed that social programs required
substantial change (Human Resources
Development Canada 1994).
Central to this readiness for social secu-
rity reform was the Conservatives’ successful
campaign to convince Canadians about the
serious problem of mounting debt and the
need to put the nation’s finances in order. In
addition, federal cuts to UI and to social
transfer payments to the provinces under the
Conservatives began to weaken the co-oper-
ative federalism model of the 1960s and
1970s. The Liberals have advanced the move
towards the post-welfare state that was begun
by the Conservatives. The Conservatives were
devastated in the 1993 federal election and
supplanted by Reform/Canadian Alliance, a
right-wing party that espouses a much more
conservative and decentralist platform than
the Conservatives (which, like the Liberals,
are a broad-based party with supporters rang-
ing from the far right to the left of centre).
Another political factor that has played
a huge part throughout the history of Canada
and its social programs is federalism. For
much of the post-war period, Ottawa played
a dominant role in the distribution of power
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the provinces. But the pendulum has been
swinging back in the 1990s and first decade
of the new century. The two levels of gov-
ernment now play equally important roles in
what Professor Keith Banting has dubbed
Canada’s “bifurcated welfare state” (Banting
1987). While Ottawa dominates income
security policy, the provinces also are players.
And while the provinces deliver most wel-
fare, social services and health care, Ottawa
has reduced its financial assistance and influ-
ence in these important areas and devolved
labour market programs to the provinces.
Thus federal cuts to social programs have
increased the relative power of the provinces
over social policy.
The shifting division of federal and
provincial powers was codified in the
February 1999 Social Union Framework
Agreement (SUFA, as it is known to bureau-
crats), signed by all governments except
Quebec. The Agreement is intended to pro-
mote a respectful and collaborative approach
by senior levels of government in dealing
with major social problems (e.g., poverty,
homelessness, unemployment) that are not
neatly defined as exclusively federal or
provincial. Ottawa alone no longer would
spell out the rules under which provinces
receive federal funds. Rather, any such rules
would be set jointly by the federal and
provincial governments.
The thinking that shaped the Social
Union negotiations viewed federal and
provincial relations as a partnership — a big
buzzword in the new public policy — in
which both levels of government have an
important role. Partnership effectively results
in different responses to the same problem.
It can give rise to differences across regions
in the same policy area. The resulting vari-
ability throughout the country is seen as not
only  inevitable but desirable, as jurisdictions
work within their respective fiscal and polit-
ical priorities.
Another important element of this
Agreement is the concept of public account-
ability. All governments are seen as account-
able both individually and collectively, to the
public and to groups that have a special
interest in certain issues, such as services for
children or supports for persons with dis-
abilities.
Images of Social Policy
A final force helping to drive and shape
the transformation of Canadian social policy
is a new conceptual framework that is sup-
planting the universalist model here and in
much of Europe. For want of a better term, I
refer to this new model of social policy as
“post-welfare state” (Battle 2000).
The post-welfare state model pursues
the same fundamental objectives of social
policy set out in the universalist model
more than half a century ago, which I char-
acterize as “civilizing capitalism” (by ensur-
ing a basic income safety net, reducing
market inequalities and delivering services
that don’t belong in marketplace) and as
“nurturing capitalism” (by providing social
and educational infrastructure that
enhances economic growth and investing in
human capital). The post-welfare model is
based on a critique of key social programs
— especially UI and welfare — that sees
them as costly, inefficient and ineffective.
The new model seeks mechanisms that are
more effective and better suited to the
changing economic, social and political
realities of the new century. And while eco-
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versalist model, they are front and centre in
the post-welfare model.
The post-welfare state is very much an
emerging project, and does not seek to cre-
ate an entirely brave new world, retaining as
it does certain elements of the universalist
and residualist models that preceded it.
However, we can identify several key con-
cepts of the post-welfare approach as it is
being developed in Canada:
> broad-based and progressive income-
testing replaces demogrants and needs-
tested income security programs (but
not social insurance, nor social, health
and employment services);
> attention to alleged unintended work
disincentive effects of social programs
— e.g., marginal tax rate issue regard-
ing income-tested social benefits, wel-
fare wall;
> attention to interactions and links
between social programs and the tax
system;
> desire to right the balance between
“active” and “passive” social programs,
reactive and preventive approaches;
> concern to harmonize federal and
provincial social programs, reduce
duplication and overlap, and work
together;
> concern about the financial sustain-
ability of social programs (e.g., no
more federal blank cheques through
cost-sharing for social transfers to
provinces);
> recognition that there are multiple
players (public, private sector and vol-
untary) in social policy, and the need to
better utilize and combine their
resources through partnership;
> increasing recognition that communi-
ties have a major role to play on social
policy design as well as delivery;
> emphasis on the economic functions of
social policy, especially on education
and training to ensure a competitive
workforce, and in supplying the social
infrastructure (e.g., universal health
care, education) that will support eco-
nomic growth and attract a talented
workforce;
> emphasis on the need to measure the
outcomes of social policy and on social
reporting made available to the public
and social advocacy groups.
The following section elaborates on a
number of these themes.
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 
CANADIAN INCOME SECURITY
POLICY
Almost all major social programs in
Canada have undergone or are experiencing
changes in the transition from the universal-
ist to post-welfare state. Some of these shifts
have been incremental, though a series of
seemingly modest changes over time can add
up or lead to more significant structural
reform. Other changes have been more
immediate and radical.
The following discussion identifies and
analyzes general trends and developments in
income security policy, based on my analysis
of detailed changes in the many programs.
The latter are listed in a chronology of indi-
vidual reforms to major federal and provin-
cial social programs in the 1980s, 1990s and
2000s to be published by the Caledon
Institute of Social Policy.
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from Universality?
One of the hallmarks of the universal-
ist model of social security is its faith in the
virtues of serving the entire population or
large groups thereof: coverage should be
“universal.” To use the current vocabulary,
social programs should be a force for social
solidarity, promoting “social inclusion” and
combating “social exclusion.” In an older and
rather more realpolitik language, social pro-
grams that serve Canadians at all income lev-
els are claimed to foster political support for
the welfare state overall (including programs
targeted to the poor). According to this line
of thinking, voters — especially the broad
middle class that constitute the majority —
must perceive that their taxes buy them some
social benefits too, not just the poor.
Caledon’s Senior Scholar, Michael Mendelson,
talks of the “middle class bargain” underly-
ing medicare: the middle-class majority of
Canadians will support a single-tier public
health insurance financing arrangement (and
oppose privatization of essential services) so
long as they perceive that it provides them
adequate and accessible health care.
The defining characteristic of a univer-
sal social program (or demogrant, as it used
to be called) is that it is made available to all
regardless of their income level or other eco-
nomic circumstances. But that does not mean
that a universal social program serves the
entire population, since it always imposes
some sort of (non-income) qualifying condi-
tion, such as age, disability or work status.
The only social program in Canada that ben-
efits virtually every Canadian is medicare —
it would be hard to imagine anyone never
encountering that system at some point in
his or her life — but even here there is a key
qualifying condition: the person receiving
care must be deemed to require essential
health services. While medicare remains uni-
versal in the sense that essential health care
is still provided at no direct charge, critics
argue that in reality the accessibility, quali-
ty and supply of publicly insured health serv-
ices have been compromised by funding cuts
and problems in adapting to new pressures
(e.g., an aging population, expensive tech-
nology and drugs).
By the 1980s, Canada had several
major income security programs that could
be considered universal in the sense of not
imposing income-based qualifying condi-
tions. At the federal level, universal benefits
included OAS, Family Allowances, UI, the
CPP and veterans’ disability pension. At the
provincial level were the universal QPP and
Workers’ Compensation.
The 1990s brought a major assault on
universality, though only at the federal level.
However, pro-universalist critics have demo-
nized the demise of old age pensions and
child benefits, which were dwarfed by the
severe shrinkage in coverage of UI.
Coverage is also a relevant issue for non-
universal income security programs. Access to
needs-tested provincial social assistance (wel-
fare) programs has been tightened by changes
to their qualifying conditions (National
Council of Welfare 1997). Partial de-indexa-
tion of the federal refundable GST credit and
the refundable child tax credit and its succes-
sors, the Child Tax Benefit and the Canada
Child Tax Benefit, and the non-indexation of
provincial income-tested child benefits, earn-
ings supplements and refundable tax credits
gradually have shrunk the size of the qualify-
ing population compared to what it would be
under full indexation.
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income-tested programs — income-tested
child benefits and earnings supplements,
under the National Child Benefit (NCB) —
are increasing coverage over their needs-tested
predecessor (i.e., welfare payments on
behalf of children), expanding beyond wel-
fare recipients to include the working poor
and, in some cases, modest-income
Canadians as well.
Elderly benefits. In 1989, OAS was sub-
jected to the infamous “clawback” that
effectively transformed it into an income-
tested program by 1991, when the changes
were fully phased in. During this bizarre
Alice-in-Wonderland episode in Canadian
social policy, the federal government con-
tinued to send out monthly OAS cheques to
all Canadians 65 or older but required
upper-income seniors to pay back part or all
of their benefits the next spring on their
income tax return. Ottawa claimed that the
program was still “universal,” but in effect
it imposed an ex post facto income test
through a weird administrative mechanism
that I argued at the time meant that well-
off seniors effectively got an interest-free
loan (i.e., the temporary use of their month-
ly OAS payments) for one year. In 1996, the
federal government abandoned its odd ex
post facto income test and applied it in the
same manner as regular income tests (e.g.,
the Child Tax Benefit or the refundable
GST credit): eligibility was determined
before benefits were paid out, on the basis
of net income as calculated in the annual
income tax form, so that upper-income sen-
iors do not receive an OAS cheque.
However, Ottawa seems to want to continue
pretending that the program is universal,
since high-income seniors are informed that
the government has taxed back their OAS
(even though they never see the money).
But the impact of the income test on
OAS has been wildly exaggerated and in fact
the program remains quasi-universal. The
income test applies to individual net income
above $53,960; benefits are reduced increas-
ingly (at the rate of 15 percent of benefits
above that level) until net income exceeds
$87,025, when eligibility ends. A mere 2
percent of seniors receive no OAS and only 3
percent get partial benefits; fully 95 percent
still receive their full monthly cheque
(though benefits remain taxable). While par-
tial de-indexation of the income threshold for
the income test over time gradually extended
the reach of the test further down the income
scale, that stealthy acceleration of the income
test was stopped in 2000 by the federal bud-
get’s momentous decision to restore full
indexation of the personal income tax system
and child benefits.
Rarely noticed in the critics’ furore
over the death of universal old age pensions
was the 1984 move to income test the age
exemption (changed in 1986 to a non-
refundable credit), which affected far more
seniors than the clawback of OAS. The age
credit is now worth a maximum $900 in
total federal and average provincial income
tax savings and is income tested above
individual net income of $26,284 at the
rate of 15 percent, reaching zero at
$49,824. As is the case with the OAS
income test, the recent decision to restore
full indexation of the personal income tax
system put a stop to the age credit’s grad-
ual erosion in value and compression down
the income range.
Moreover, the elderly benefits system
overall remains effectively universal because
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it, which serves all seniors with private pen-
sion income — which, in the case of those in
the upper income ranges who do not qualify
for OAS, is virtually everyone.
Child benefits. No area of Canadian social
policy has seen more changes over the past two
decades than federal child benefits (Battle and
Mendelson 2001). The move from universality
to income testing was essentially the same as
for OAS — that is, first the 1989 clawback on
Family Allowances, then full income testing
with the 1993 Child Tax Benefit that replaced
FA (and the income-tested refundable and non-
refundable child tax credits). However, the
changes to child benefits reduced coverage
more than for elderly benefits, because the
CTB’s income test is based on family as
opposed to individual income. The 1993 CTB
served about eight in 10 families with chil-
dren, and partial indexation was gradually low-
ering the income threshold for the income test
and thus reducing coverage over time.
But ongoing changes to child benefits
under the federal-provincial NCB reform
have increased their coverage. The Canada
Child Tax Benefit, which replaced the CTB
in 1998, involves mainly an increase in and
equalization of benefits for low-income fam-
ilies (discussed below). But coverage is being
increased as well, through increases to the
base CTB and its income threshold for max-
imum payments and a planned lowering of
the reduction rate. Moreover, the restoration
of full indexation in 2000 ends the stealthy
on-the-one-hand/on-the-other-hand shell
game whereby increases to child benefits
were eroded by inflation. By 2004, some 95
percent of Canadian families will be receiv-
ing the CCTB — the same quasi-universal
coverage as OAS.
Unemployment Insurance. The real whack
at coverage involves UI which, though
remaining universal in a technical sense —
level of income does not exclude eligibility
— saw its coverage more than halved in the
1990s as a result of a series of draconian
changes to its major qualifying condition,
work requirements.
In 1990, Ottawa increased the number
of weeks worked in order to qualify for ben-
efits from 10-14 weeks to 10-20 weeks,
depending on the regional jobless rate.
Effective July 1994, employees had to work a
minimum of 12 weeks to be eligible for UI
if they lived in a region with an unemploy-
ment rate of 13 percent or higher; before, the
minimum qualifying period was only 10
weeks, though for a regional jobless rate of
16 percent or more.
In July 1996, the program was
renamed Employment Insurance to signal a
fundamental philosophical shift — from
“passive” dependence to “active” employ-
ment. The objectives of the overhaul were to
keep more unemployed workers off the pro-
gram, move current recipients off as quickly
as possible, and encourage greater workforce
participation through skills training and
upgrading.
Eligibility for benefits was moved from
number of weeks worked to number of hours.
The stated purpose of this change was to
allow more flexibility in the program and to
enable part-time workers, in particular, to
qualify for EI. But the Act also boosted the
number of hours required to qualify for ben-
efits. Workers now must put in from 420 to
700 hours (the equivalent of 12-20 weeks),
depending on the unemployment rate in the
region. This change represents an increase of
between 180 and 300 hours.
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maternity or parental benefits need 700
(lowered in 2000 to 600) hours of work.
New entrants to the labour market and
those who have been out of paid work for
some years must establish a reasonable
attachment to the job market before they
are considered eligible for EI. Newcomers
or those re-entering the labour market
must work a minimum 910 hours before
qualifying for the program, though this
rule subsequently was rescinded for parents
re-entering the workforce (who now require
the same number of hours as other workers
to qualify for regular benefits).
The maximum duration of benefits was
cut three times during the 1990s. The new
Employment Insurance Act reduced the max-
imum length of claim from 50 to 45 weeks.
The tougher work requirements and
reduced duration of benefits dramatically cut
EI coverage. The percentage of the unemployed
receiving regular UI/EI benefits fell from 83
percent in 1989 to just 45 percent in 1998.
The coverage problem is exacerbated
by the fact that the EI program’s employ-
ment benefits are linked to its income bene-
fits. Unemployed Canadians who no longer
qualify for income assistance are also, as a
result, denied the program’s work-related
measures. The long-term unemployed, the
underemployed, new workers and part-time
workers find it especially difficult to gain
access to labour market measures that might
help them improve their job prospects
(Torjman 2000).
But there is more to the UI/EI story
than shrinkage of coverage. One important
benefit — parental leave — should
increase its reach somewhat over the orig-
inal EI legislation.
Until recently, EI offered a maximum
15 weeks’ maternity leave and an additional
10 weeks’ leave for either parent, for a com-
bined total of 25 weeks’ leave. The 2000 fed-
eral budget doubled the maximum duration
of combined maternity and parental leave.
This measure was in part a response to
Quebec’s announced initiatives in this area and
in part to put some reality into the rhetoric of
the federal-provincial “National Children’s
Agenda.” Parental leave has been extended to
a maximum of 35 weeks, which, when added
to the existing 15 weeks’ maternity leave, pro-
vides for a total maximum of 50 weeks’ leave
for parenting. Allowing recipients of parental
leave to work part-time ($50 or 25 percent of
weekly benefits, above which benefits are
reduced dollar for dollar) may widen the pro-
gram’s reach somewhat. So too will the deci-
sion to reduce the entrance requirement from
700 to 600 insurable work hours. 
On the other hand, there was no
increase in parental benefits’ earnings-
replacement capacity, which replaces only 55
percent of maximum insurable earnings
(though it can be as high as 80 percent for
low-income families with children eligible
for the Family Income Supplement brought
in with the Employment Insurance pro-
gram).  While the maximum weekly EI ben-
efit is $413, the actual average weekly
maternity benefit is much lower, at $280 in
1999. The level of benefits affects coverage:
Many parents are not able to live on that
amount — especially if they are single par-
ents and EI parental leave is their only source
of income.
The large increase in the entrance
requirements under Employment Insurance
reduced the number of people qualifying not
only for regular benefits but also parental leave
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to 600 hours), thus disqualifying many part-
time workers. In its Analysis of UI Coverage for
Women, the Canadian Labour Congress (2000)
calculated that, while close to eighty percent
of women between the ages of 25 and 44 are
in the paid workforce, only 49 percent of
women who gave birth in 1998 received
maternity benefits and 46 percent got parental
benefits. Younger working women and those
with lower earnings were unlikely to receive
parental leave. Another problem is that EI does
not cover the self-employed — a significant pro-
portion of the Canadian workforce that has
grown over time.
In fairness (if that is not being too
charitable), the federal government paints a
very different picture of the coverage of
Employment Insurance (Human Resources
Development Canada 2000). It says that the
change to hours-based coverage, by making
virtually all employment insurable, has
extended coverage among low-earning work-
ers. It argues that only half the decline in the
ratio of UI recipients to the total unemployed
in the 1990s leading up to the shift to
Employment Insurance was due to program
reforms, while the rest was the result of
changes in the labour market (e.g., more
long-term unemployed). It also rejects the
use of the total number of unemployed as the
denominator for calculating coverage, argu-
ing that the latter is too broad because it
includes people for whom the program is not
intended, such as individuals who have never
worked, those who have not worked in the
past year or quit their job without just cause,
and people who used to be self-employed.
Instead, claims Human Resources Develop-
ment Canada in its Employment Insurance 2000
Monitoring and Assessment Report, Employment
Insurance covered 80 percent of the unem-
ployed “for whom the program was
designed” in 1999 and that coverage accord-
ing to this definition has remained stable
under the new EI program. This rather
Orwellian redefinition of coverage will come
as little comfort to the many unemployed
Canadians who pay Employment Insurance
premiums but do not qualify for benefits.
Canada Pension Plan. The CPP and its
sister, the Quebec Pension Plan, provide uni-
versal coverage to all Canadians who work in
the labour force, either for employers or
themselves. However, coverage of one of the
programs’ components — disability benefit
— has been subject to expansion or contrac-
tion resulting from legislative and adminis-
trative changes (Torjman 1999).
Several changes served to increase CPP
coverage among persons with disabilities,
which almost doubled in the first half of the
1990s (from 182,000 beneficiaries in 1990
to 298,000 by 1995). These changes were
rooted in the recommendation of the 1981
Commons Committee on the Disabled and
Handicapped to boost benefits and coverage
as the first step towards comprehensive
reform of income support for Canadians with
disabilities — a reform that still has not
taken place 30 years after the release of the
Committee’s landmark report, Obstacles.
In 1987, contributory requirements for
the CPP disability benefit were relaxed (from
at least five of the past 10 years, in order to
qualify, to two of the past three years) and
retroactivity claims were extended (from 12 to
15 months). In 1992, a private member’s bill,
Bill C-57, sought to tackle the problem of
potential recipients being unaware that the
CPP pays disability benefits. Disability claims
were opened up to many workers previously
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late applications. In 1993 and 1994, in an
effort to reduce pressure on provincial welfare
costs, the Ontario government required wel-
fare recipients with disabilities to apply for the
federal CPP disability benefit. The Auditor
General’s 1993 report reiterated the need to
improve public awareness of the CPP disabil-
ity provision, which led to Human Resources
Development Canada’s launching a major
public information campaign. Moreover, the
program broadened its scope to recognize
additional disability-engendering conditions
such as stress, environmental hypersensitivity
and chronic fatigue, and non-medical factors
(such as the regional unemployment rate,
availability of certain jobs and applicants’
skills) were taken into account for older appli-
cants (aged 55-64) who typically find it hard-
er to find work (i.e., CPP disability benefit
was used as a de facto UI program policy to
encourage earlier retirement — a practice also
then common in several European countries).
Finally, the rising number of claims likely
meant that the Department could devote less
attention to verifying whether existing bene-
ficiaries still were eligible, thus creating a form
of caseload inertia.
The rapid rise in the caseload in the
first half of the 1990s sparked measures to
tighten access to the CPP disability benefit.
Administration was sharpened (e.g., regard-
ing reassessments and tracking of clients,
administrative data-linking to detect recipi-
ents who were receiving benefits from other
programs), tougher guidelines were issued for
determining medical eligibility (including
an end to the use of socio-economic factors)
and the appeals system was made more for-
mal and toughened. Back-to-work efforts
were increased. These changes contributed to
a decline in the number of CPP disability
beneficiaries after 1995.
Welfare. The Canada Health and Social
Transfer’s replacement of the Canada
Assistance Plan in 1996 meant that the fed-
eral government no longer requires provin-
cial welfare systems to provide income
assistance to all persons deemed to be “in
need,” regardless of category. Most provinces
have introduced new rules making it more
difficult for certain groups to get on or
remain on welfare. The purpose of these
tightened eligibility rules is to reduce the
size of the welfare caseload (National Council
of Welfare 1997).
Quebec, for example, was the first
jurisdiction to bring in a “parental contribu-
tion.” Adults 18 years of age and over who
have not yet declared their independence
(e.g., they are not married or have no chil-
dren of their own to support) are considered
dependent. Their parents are required to con-
tribute maintenance and support.
Ontario announced in 1995 that an
employable person quitting or losing a job
without just cause was disqualified from
applying for welfare for three months. Several
provinces have reclassified single parents
with young children as employable — which
means that they can remain on social assis-
tance only for a short period before they are
expected to start taking “active” work-relat-
ed measures.
Some provinces, such as Ontario, have
completely revamped their welfare systems.
In 1997, the province replaced two existing
welfare laws with Ontario Works, intended
for employable welfare recipients, and the
Ontario Disability Supports Program, for
persons with long-term disabilities. Ontario
Works has been particularly controversial. It
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introduced a program that made it manda-
tory for recipients to participate in a work-
related or community service program
(Torjman 1998). Recently, the Ontario gov-
ernment announced plans to impose manda-
tory drug testing for welfare recipients and
compulsory treatment for those found to have
a drug problem; recipients who refuse test-
ing will be cut off benefits.
Other jurisdictions have not undertak-
en such a fundamental reform, but over the
past few years they all have introduced some
type of “active programming” — a concept
promoted by the OECD. All jurisdictions
have introduced measures to encourage the
transition from “dependency” to “self-suffi-
ciency.” The “active” programs have different
name: Supports to Employment Program in
Newfoundland, Ontario Works, Employment
First in Manitoba, the Saskatchewan Training
Strategy, Supports for Independence in Alberta
and Productive Choices in the Northwest
Territories. Despite the differences in name,
the intent is the same: to help move recipients
off welfare and into the paid labour market.
While they vary, these programs follow
the same general pattern. They seek to pro-
vide welfare recipients with the supports and
skills to move off assistance as quickly as pos-
sible. Help may take the form of job search,
preparation of résumés, literacy training,
skills development, academic upgrading and
job referral.
In addition to the active measures that
focus on work skills and requirements,
provinces have introduced various supports
— such as earnings supplements, extended
health benefits or child care subsidies —
designed to encourage workforce participa-
tion. Jurisdictions have brought in these
measures in respect of the NCB reinvestment
strategy discussed above.
Disability tax benefits. One aspect of the
tax/transfer system that has enjoyed modest,
incremental, unheralded but steady improve-
ments in coverage (and, as discussed below,
benefits) is tax assistance for Canadians with
disabilities (and their supporting families).
Eligibility for the disability credit has been
broadened to include individuals with severe
and prolonged disabilities who require exten-
sive therapy on an ongoing basis. The unused
portion of the disability credit can be trans-
ferred to a wider group of supporting rela-
tives, including siblings, aunts and uncles.
Ottawa added a new supplement of up to
$500 to provide more assistance to caregivers
of children with severe disabilities. The list
of items eligible for the medical expense tax
credit has been expanded to include cost of
modifications to new homes to assist indi-
viduals with severe mobility impairments
(Torjman 1999).
However, access to the disability tax
credit remains restrictive — and it, in turn,
is a requirement for the higher child-care
expense deduction for children with disabil-
ities. The medical expense credit allows only
a narrow list of eligible items. Apart from a
small supplement for the working poor
under medical expense credit, non-refundable
tax credits provide little or no assistance to
the poorest Canadians with disabilities who
owe little or no income tax.
Changes in Benefits: Cavalry
Charge Against Social Programs
or Guerrilla Subversion?
The widespread notion that Canada’s
income security programs have slashed their
benefits is, like the “death of universality,”
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programs (notably welfare and UI) have
imposed benefit reductions; others (e.g., pub-
lic pension programs) remain essentially
unchanged; and a few (child benefits and,
though only recently, the personal income tax
system) have enjoyed real increases in benefits.
Welfare. Welfare has experienced covert
and, in some provinces, overt declines in ben-
efits and tightening of eligibility require-
ments. No jurisdiction indexes its social
assistance rates, not even partially, which
means that their value decreases in real terms
each year by the rate of inflation — even
though their face (nominal) value stays the
same. While initially this small erosion may
seem small — especially in the current era of
low inflation — the losses compound over
the years, in a deadly flip of the “miracle of
compound interest.” In 1990, I coined the
term “social policy by stealth” to character-
ize governments’ use of relatively hidden
technical mechanisms (chiefly non-indexa-
tion and partial indexation) to reduce bene-
fits without having to portray these changes
as cuts (Battle 1990).
Some provinces, notably Alberta and
Ontario, also made overt cuts to social assis-
tance rates, which have hastened the process
of benefit erosion. The incoming Conservative
government in Ontario slashed rates for most
categories by 21.6 percent in October 1995,
which rescinded previous administrations’
more-than-inflation increases.
As a result of these covert and overt
cuts, between 1989 and 1999 welfare bene-
fits for single employables fell in value in
nine of 11 jurisdictions for which trend
data are available — ranging from a real
(inflation-adjusted) loss of 75.3 percent
in Newfoundland to 8.2 percent in
Saskatchewan (National Council of Welfare
2000). Among single disabled recipients,
welfare benefits declined in real terms in
seven of 11 jurisdictions, ranging from 26.8
percent in New Brunswick to 1.3 percent in
Manitoba. Their value fell in nine of 11 juris-
dictions for single parents with one child
(from 23.1 percent in Saskatchewan to 0.6
percent in Quebec) and in nine of 11 juris-
dictions for couples with two children, rang-
ing from 27.3 percent in Manitoba to 7.8
percent in British Columbia.
Measured in terms of the Low Income
Cut-off for the largest city in each province,
welfare incomes (i.e., social assistance plus
child benefits, refundable tax credits and other
social benefits) in 1999 for a single parent
with one child under age two, for example,
ranged from 49.8 percent of the low income
line in Manitoba to 50.1 percent in Alberta,
57.0 percent in Quebec, 59.5 percent in
Saskatchewan, 59.8 percent in Prince Edward
Island, 60.1 percent in British Columbia, 60.3
percent in Ontario, 61.7 percent in New
Brunswick, 62.9 percent in Nova Scotia and
69.7 percent in Newfoundland (National
Council of Welfare 2000).
Welfare benefits for single persons
considered able to work are even lower. In
1999, rates ranged from a mere $1,341 or
9.1 percent of the low income line in the
largest city in Newfoundland to a “high” of
$6,330 or 40.7 percent of the poverty line
in Ontario; benefits for single persons with
disabilities went from a low of 42.1 percent
of the low income line in Alberta to a high
of 70.1 percent in Ontario. For two-parent
families with children, 1999 welfare
incomes ranged from a low of 45.1 percent
of the low income line in Quebec to 62.4
percent in Prince Edward Island.
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changes have diminished the value of UI
benefits as well. In 1993, UI benefits were
reduced from 60 to 57 percent of insurable
earnings; in 1994, they were lowered again,
to 55 percent. The upper limit in the band
of earnings over which benefits are calculat-
ed (called the “maximum insurable earnings
level”) fell from $42,380 to $39,000 when
Employment Insurance replaced UI on
Canada Day 1996, and this level was frozen
until 2000 (subsequently extended to
2001), which meant that it has declined
both overtly and covertly in real terms.
Maximum benefits thus dropped from $448
to $413 a week. The maximum length of
claim was reduced from 50 to 45 weeks.
The new EI scheme also imposed an
“intensity rule.” Recipients faced a penalty
of a one percentage point reduction in their
benefit replacement rate after each 20 weeks
of benefits, reducing the rate from 55 percent
to as low as 50 percent. This rule was intend-
ed to reduce the heavy repeat reliance on EI
by seasonal workers, encouraging them to
seek full-time work.
Employment Insurance continues UI’s
practice of imposing an income test or “claw-
back” that partially taxes back benefits from
better-off recipients. However, the clawback
now affects more recipients because the
income threshold for the clawback dropped
from (net) $63,570 to $47,750. Clawed-back
recipients must repay their benefits at the
rate of 30 percent above net income of
$39,000 for those collecting benefits for 20
weeks or more, and above $47,750 for those
with less than 20 weeks.
The tightening of UI was not politi-
cally painless. Several Liberal MPs in Atlantic
Canada (hard hit by the changes) lost their
seats in the 1997 federal election due in part
to the controversy over EI. These included
the Minister of Defence, Doug Young, who
had been Minister of Human Resources
Development Canada. As a result, the
Liberals back-pedalled somewhat as they
went into the 2000 election; they recently
rescinded the intensity rule, raised the
threshold for the clawback of benefits from
$47,750 to $48,750 in net income, and
abandoned the lower ($39,000) threshold for
those collecting benefits for 20 weeks or
more. As well, recipients of maternity,
parental and sickness benefits no longer are
subject to the clawback.
Canada Pension Plan. In consultations
on the most recent round of reform of the
CPP, Ottawa put forward various proposals
aimed at ensuring the program’s financial
and political sustainability in the face of ris-
ing demands from an aging population, espe-
cially the baby boomers whose leading edge
will hit the pension system as early as five
years from now (i.e., boomers born in 1946,
who are eligible for CPP retirement benefits
as early as age 60). Options to cut benefits
included reducing the earnings replacement
rate for new retirees, tightening the dropout
provisions for years of no or low earnings and
child-rearing, raising the age of retirement,
partially de-indexing benefits, tightening the
administration and work requirements for
disability benefits, and killing the death ben-
efit. But there was widespread opposition to
cutting CPP benefits and general support for
dealing with the sustainability problem
chiefly by means of a radical change in
financing — a move from pay-go to partial
funding (discussed later in this paper).
However, CPP benefits did not escape
completely. Ottawa and the provinces agreed
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technical modifications that affect future
pensioners and that few people will under-
stand. Although these changes shaved the
value of retirement benefits slightly (by 1.7
percent), the losses will hurt lower-income
pensioners and their survivors hardest in rel-
ative terms.
Changes have been made to the way in
which benefits are to be calculated for both
retirement pensions and the earnings-related
portions of the disability and survivor bene-
fits. Benefits were based on the average Year’s
Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE) for
the last three years, but in future will be cal-
culated on an average for the last five years.
While this change may be more consistent
with the majority of private plans, it will
reduce benefits for most workers because
wages usually reach their peak at the end of
a person’s working life. The overall average
based on a five-year span typically will be
lower than an overall average based on a
three-year span, which generally includes the
highest level of earnings.
Several changes were made to the dis-
ability benefit. Eligibility for this benefit has
required that contributions be made in two
of the past three years or five of the past 10
years; this is being lengthened to four of the
past six years. Disability benefits no longer
will be paid to estates, and Canadians already
receiving early retirement benefits will not
be eligible for disability benefits. The admin-
istration of the benefit will be tightened
through more frequent reassessments and
new appeal procedures.
The way in which retirement benefits are
calculated for disability beneficiaries also is
being be modified. These pensions used to be
based on the YMPE when the recipient turned
65 and then indexed to prices. The retirement
benefit for disability beneficiaries now will be
based on the YMPE at the time of disablement
(regardless of when this occurred) and subse-
quent price indexing. In addition, disability
benefits will no longer be paid to estates, and
recipients of an early retirement benefit will no
longer be eligible for disability benefits.
Prior to the Finance Minister’s
announcement, the combined survivor-dis-
ability benefits were based on a ceiling
equivalent to the maximum retirement pen-
sion plus the larger of the two flat-rate com-
ponents of the survivor and disability
benefits. The new ceiling is now one maxi-
mum disability pension. There has been no
change to the ceiling of the combined sur-
vivor-retirement benefits.
The death benefit was not withdrawn
but its value has been reduced from its for-
mer level of six months of retirement bene-
fits to a maximum of $3,580 with wage
indexation to six months of retirement bene-
fits to a maximum of $2,500 with no index-
ation, so it will shrink steadily in future.
Elderly benefits. If Social Security (the
public pension system in the United States)
is the “third rail” of American politics, then
old age pensions are the fourth rail of
Canadian politics, after medicare. Both the
Conservative and Liberal governments
received a jolt when they entertained options
to slow the relentless rise in expenditures on
elderly benefits. In its first term, the
Mulroney government was forced by a
media-empowered pensioners’ lobby (sup-
ported by social advocacy groups and even
the corporate sector) to back off from its pro-
posal to partially de-index OAS benefits,
which remained fully indexed. A decade
later, the Liberals backed down from their
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benefits, the Seniors Benefit; this reform
would have had a progressive redistributive
impact, increasing benefits for low- and
modest-income seniors while reducing or
removing payments to upper-income seniors,
and fully indexing the threshold for the new
program’s family income test (Battle 1997,
Government of Canada 1996). (The last real
increase to federal elderly benefits — to the
income-tested GIS — was under the Trudeau
government, back in 1984.)
However, the Tories managed to
implement stealthy, politically safe cost-trim-
ming modifications to elderly benefits that
their Liberal successors gratefully left in
place. The Conservatives’ 1988 income tax
reforms shifted most exemptions and deduc-
tions to non-refundable credits, thus reduc-
ing their value (including two pension tax
expenditures, the age exemption and pension
income deduction) for higher-income pen-
sioners. In 1994, the Tories imposed an
income test on the age credit, reducing or
removing tax savings from middle- and
upper-income taxpayers. The Mulroney gov-
ernment also made a fundamental structural
change to the tax/transfer system, ending full
indexation in 1986. The age credit was par-
tially de-indexed and the pension income
credit frozen — changes that increasingly
eroded the value of these tax breaks over the
years. The Conservative-imposed clawback
on OAS also undermined the value of bene-
fits for higher-income pensioners subject to
the clawback: as the partially de-indexed
income threshold for the clawback declined
steadily in real terms each year, more and
more seniors (at declining income levels)
became subject to the clawback and, while
they still ended up with partial benefits even
after the clawback, the latter effectively took
a bigger bite out of their payments. In addi-
tion, the income level above which benefits
are fully taxed back fell in small but steady
steps and so also eroded benefits. As noted
earlier, only a small percentage of seniors (5
percent, at last count) are subject to the
income test on OAS, though that percentage
would have continued to increase over the
years had the Liberals not restored full index-
ation as of 2000.
While the Liberals finally restored full
indexation to the federal tax/transfer system,
they did not fully restore tax credits and
thresholds to their original value. And while
the threshold for the income test on OAS was
fully indexed, thus rising from $53,215 in
1999 to $53,960 for 2000, the latter amount
is worth only $42,540 in 1989 dollars (as
opposed to it original $50,000 level in
1989). This means that the threshold fell by
$7,460 in constant dollars — a sizable 14.9
percent decline — between 1989 and 2000
as a result of partial de-indexation.
Nonetheless, the restoration of full indexa-
tion is a major improvement in Canadian
tax/transfer policy, since it halts the stealthy
slide in the value of a number of important
tax benefits, including those for seniors, and
solidifies ongoing increases to the CCTB.
Tax deductions for private pension contri-
butions. Successive federal governments have
been of two minds about tax breaks for pri-
vate pension and retirement savings, want-
ing to enrich them but pulling back for fear
of the enormous costs involved, as these are
among the most expensive of all tax expen-
ditures — an estimated net cost of $15.3 bil-
lion in 2001, or more than double what
Ottawa spends on the CCTB. The Mulroney
government initially announced a large,
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contributions, eventually to reach $15,500
and then be indexed to average wages, but
subsequently slowed the schedule of increase;
the level was frozen at $7,500 from 1988
through 1990, then went up to $11,500 in
1991, $12,500 for 1992 and 1993 and
$13,500 in 1994. The Liberal government’s
1996 budget turned to the tried-and-true
tactics of social policy by stealth and
announced that the tax deduction limit
would be frozen at its current level of
$13,500 until 2003, then increased to
$14,500 in 2004 and $15,500 in 2005. This
freeze, like the Tories’ before it, is reducing
the maximum amount of federal and provin-
cial income tax savings for contributors and,
as a result, slowing the rising cost to the fed-
eral and provincial governments of the result-
ing tax expenditure. Ottawa eliminated the
seven-year limit on carrying forward unused
Registered Retirement Savings Plan contri-
butions, a change that will help taxpayers
make up for years when they are unable to
contribute much or anything to their RRSPs.
On the other hand, it lowered the maximum
age for contributing to Registered Pension
Plans and RRSPs from 71 to 69, which will
reduce the tax expenditures for private pen-
sions both by no longer allowing tax filers to
claim tax deductions at ages 70 and 71 and
by requiring them to start drawing their
pensions (which are taxable) two years soon-
er, thus adding to the federal and provincial
governments’ tax coffers.
Disability tax benefits. There has been
modest but badly needed progress in tax ben-
efits for Canadians with disabilities (and their
supporting families). The disability tax cred-
it amount was increased in 2001 from
$4,293 (providing federal income tax savings
of $687 and combined average federal/
provincial tax savings of $1,030) to $6,000
($960 in federal tax savings, $1,440 average
federal/provincial tax savings) and now is
fully indexed. The tax credit amount for care-
givers of dependent relatives who are elder-
ly, infirm or disabled rises in 2001 from
$2,386 ($382 federal tax savings, $573 aver-
age federal/provincial savings) to $3,500
($560 federal, $840 average federal/provin-
cial tax savings). The child care expense
deduction (which delivers income tax savings
that rise with the claimant’s marginal tax
rate) also increases in 2001, from $7,000 to
$10,000, on behalf of children eligible for
the disability credit.
Child benefits. The income security pol-
icy that has seen the most significant increase
is federal child benefits. Over the past few
years, Ottawa has made a series of substan-
tial increases to the CCTB that has boosted
payments to low-income families.
In 1997, the previous Child Tax
Benefit paid a maximum $1,020 per child,
plus an earnings supplement worth up to
$500 per family. It was replaced in 1998 by
the CCTB, which eliminated the Working
Income Supplement for the working poor in
favour of a larger, equal maximum benefit for
all low-income families (whether working or
on welfare or UI). Currently (as of July
2001), the maximum CCTB is $2,372 for
one child ($1,255 in the National Child
Benefit Supplement and $1,117 in basic
CTB), $2,172 for a second child ($1,055
Supplement and $1,117 basic Credit) and
$2,175 ($980 Supplement, $1,117 basic
Credit and $78 additional basic Credit for
each child more than the second) for the
third and each additional child. The federal
government’s stated target is to increase the
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child, $2,308 for a second child and $2,311
for each additional child by 2004. (These
rates will come within range of meeting the
Caledon Institute’s proposed $2,800 level for
2004 dollars.)
Granted, partial de-indexation cor-
roded these increases, though the latter out-
paced the losses so that low-income families
still saw real increases in their federal child
benefits. Ottawa then went one better and
restored full indexation effective in 2000.
Maximum payments went from $2,540 for
a working poor family with two children
($2,040 for non-working poor families) in
1997 to $4,828 for all low-income families
with two kids by 2004. Adjusted for infla-
tion, this amounts to a 65 percent real
increase in federal child benefits for work-
ing poor families and 106 percent for other
poor families.
By 2004, Ottawa will spend a forecast
$9 billion on the CCTB, which, in inflation-
adjusted 2004 dollars, is a $3.3 billion or 58
percent real increase since the reform began.
Low-income families will receive about $6
billion, or two thirds of the $9 billion total
spending in 2004. Non-poor families will
get the other $3 billion, or one third.
A small but vital advance is that the
federal government, in its 1999 and 2000
budgets, began restoring child benefits for
non-poor (mainly modest- and middle-
income) families — improvements protected
by the restoration of full indexation in 2000.
In so doing, Ottawa has broadened the scope
of reform beyond the child benefit system’s
anti-poverty objective to begin bolstering its
horizontal equity performance. Thus the two
fundamental objectives of child benefits are
being simultaneously strengthened.
Under the NCB agreement, enhance-
ments in federal child benefits have enabled
provinces and territories to redirect social assis-
tance savings into a range of income security
programs and social services for low-income
families with children. Provincial reinvest-
ments to date total $305.2 million in 1998-
99 and $498.2 million in 1999-2000. Child
care took first place — 39.4 percent in 1998-
99 and 34.6 percent in 1999-2000. This was
followed by income-tested child benefits and
earnings supplements (31.1 percent in both
fiscal years), initiatives by Ontario municipal-
ities and by Aboriginal communities (21.8
and 20.9 percent), early childhood develop-
ment (4.5 and 9.3 percent) and supplementary
health care (3.1 percent the first year and 4.1
percent the next year) (Federal/provincial/ter-
ritorial governments 2001).
It must be emphasized that the
increase in federal child benefits does not
affect all low-income families equally. The
most controversial feature of the federal-
provincial NCB reform — one that lies at the
core of its policy rationale — is its differen-
tial treatment of welfare families and other
low-income families (e.g., the working poor
and EI poor). Families on social assistance in
most provinces are seeing no net increase in
their overall child benefits, because their
provincial child-related payments (from wel-
fare) are reduced (“clawed back,” to use the
popular social policy opprobrium of our
time) by the amount of the increase in feder-
al child benefits. Working poor families, on
the other hand, are seeing a substantial real
increase in child benefits, which they receive
only from the federal government in order to
bring them closer to the level of welfare fam-
ilies, which traditionally got about twice the
amount of child benefits as the working poor.
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de-indexation of the income tax system
from 1986 to 1999 eroded the value of
major social benefits in several ways (Battle
1998, 1999; Poschmann 1998). As already
explained, partial indexation of the income
thresholds for OAS and the CTB slowly but
steadily ate away at the value of benefits for
higher-income recipients; in addition, the
CTB rate was partially de-indexed (which
was not the case with OAS benefits), affect-
ing recipients at all income levels. But par-
tial de-indexation also imposed hidden
annual federal and provincial income tax
hikes on all taxpayers and added more
(poor) people to the tax rolls by lowering
the taxpaying threshold; while “bracket
creep” received public attention, in fact it
affected only a minority of taxpayers,
whereas what I called “credit corrosion”
(i.e., the steady decline in the value of par-
tially de-indexed tax credits) hit all tax-
payers each year. These stealthy and
generally regressive income tax hikes exac-
erbated losses due to the partial de-indexa-
tion of child benefits and the refundable
GST credit. Yet another negative effect of
partial de-indexation that never entered the
public discourse over social policy reform
stemmed from the interaction between
income taxes and social benefits; because
such key programs as OAS, Family
Allowances and C/QPP are (or were, in the
case of the now extinct FA) subject to fed-
eral and provincial income taxes, the value
of their after-tax benefits fell gradually as
partially indexed income taxes took an ever-
increasing bite. Family Allowances actual-
ly suffered a double whammy, as partial
de-indexation eroded their value and




The angst among universalists over the
“death of universality” has served to obscure
an equally if not more important shift in
Canadian income security policy — the dis-
placement of demogrants and needs-tested
benefits by income-tested benefits delivered
through the income tax system. I regard this
development as the most important advance
in contemporary Canadian social policy —
ironically, a trend born in and out of the anti-
deficit campaign.
Two of the bulwarks of the post-war
universalist welfare state in Canada —
Family Allowances and OAS — were
demogrants, meaning that they covered all
children and all seniors, respectively, regard-
less of economic circumstance and need. A
series of changes in the 1980s and 1990s
transformed these demogrants into income-
tested programs in which income plays two
key features — it determines eligibility for
the program (i.e., its scope, as discussed ear-
lier) and it is used to gear the amount of ben-
efit progressively to the amount of income
(i.e., the distribution of benefits).
Unfortunately, universalist critics of
the trend away from universal towards
income-tested programs fail to distinguish
between these two fundamental character-
istics of income-tested programs. The con-
fusion stems from the popular but
misunderstood term “targeting.” On the
one hand, it is true that income-tested
benefits like the federal CCTB and refund-
able GST credit and various provincial pro-
grams (including refundable tax credits,
earnings supplements and new income-
tested child benefits) are “targeted to the
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imum amount to low-income recipients
and a diminishing-to-zero amount to non-
poor recipients. But they are not targeted
to the poor in terms of their scope or cov-
erage: to the contrary, the large majority of
families with children and of seniors still
qualify for the CCTB and OAS, though
they receive less than the full amount; and
while provincial income-tested programs
are, by design, more narrowly targeted in
terms of reach, some (e.g., the British
Columbia Family Bonus) serve modest-
income as well as poor families.
Earlier, I debunked the criticism that
“targeting” of previously universal child and
elderly benefits has shrunk their reach; in
fact, the large majority of families with chil-
dren and of seniors receive benefits. Here, I
focus on the second dimension of targeting
— targeting to achieve a geared-to-income,
progressive distribution of benefits.
Child benefits. Chart 10 illustrates the
distribution of federal child benefits under
two systems in 2004 — the “old” system
(Family Allowances, the children’s tax
exemption and the refundable child tax cred-
it) in its final year (1984) and the new CCTB
as of 2004. The 1984 values have been con-
verted to constant 2004 dollars. In this
example, families have one child under age
seven and one between seven and 17.
The old system suffered from vertical
inequity: it was not logically geared to
income; poor families got less than lower-
and middle-income families and not much
more than those with high incomes. The old
system also resulted in horizontal inequity:
families with the same income but different
mixes of spousal income received different
levels of total benefit, because two of the
three benefits (Family Allowances and the
children’s tax exemption) were based on indi-
vidual income and only the refundable child
tax credit on family income.
The new CCTB allocates its payments
more progressively according to family
income. Maximum benefits ($5,063) are the
same between zero income and net family
income of $23,098 and then decline steadi-
ly to disappear at $100,225. Families with
the same total income get the same amount
of benefits, no matter what the mix of
spouses’ incomes.
Comparing the old and new systems,
families up to $35,000 in net family income
enjoy gains while the rest suffer losses. The
distributional impact of the changes is pro-
gressive. Income increases from child benefit
reform range from a hefty 25.9 percent for
families at $10,000 to 3.3 percent at
$30,000; losses range from a low of 0.1 per-
cent of income at $35,0000 to a high of 1.7
percent at $100,000. So while universalists
may lament the decline in child benefits for
non-poor families, in proportional terms the
losses are very small indeed. (Note that I am
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applauding the level of child benefits under
the new system: Caledon has advocated a
much more substantial increase in the CCTB
that would boost payments to poor families
and extend significant increases to middle-
income families.)
But the changes to federal child bene-
fits are only part of the story of the rise of
broad-based income testing. The NCB has
widened the scope of reform to include
provincial income assistance for families with
children. Income-tested child benefit pro-
grams, both federal and provincial, are dis-
placing traditional social assistance on behalf
of children.
While I regard the development of
broad-based income testing as a major advance
in social policy, it has not been embraced by
non-governmental organizations. To the con-
trary, most social advocacy groups and the
New Democratic Party have attacked the
NCB for “discriminating against welfare fam-
ilies” that are characterized (not always accu-
rately) as the “poorest of the poor” (Baker
Collins 1997; Durst 1999; National Council
of Welfare 1998).
Social assistance families indeed do not
get an increase in their net child benefits.
They see an increase in the proportion com-
ing from the federal CCTB and new provin-
cial income-tested provincial child benefits,
but an offsetting decline in the share from
traditional needs-tested social assistance ben-
efits on behalf of children. By contrast, the
working poor and other low-income families
not on social assistance enjoy a real increase
in their child benefits. This process has given
rise to a great deal of anxiety on the part of
vulnerable social assistance recipients and
anger on the part of social groups.
To rankle the critics even more, gov-
ernments have touted the NCB as a key anti-
poverty measure. But it arrived after several
years of overt and/or covert cuts to social
assistance benefits that had shrunk welfare
families’ income. It also was introduced amid
growing efforts on the part of most provinces
to require recipients to enter the workforce.
These efforts took the form of “workfare” and
tightened eligibility rules in many provinces.
The criticism that the NCB “discrimi-
nates” against welfare families misses the
essential point of the reform. Its purpose is
to restructure income security by equalizing
child benefits for all low-income families. It
seeks to raise child-related payments for poor
families not on social assistance up to the level
paid to social assistance families.
A key issue here is strategy. Ottawa
should have fully implemented the reform (as
proposed in the 1995 Caledon report One Way
to Fight Child Poverty) within a short time
(e.g., two years) rather than phasing it in
through an incremental, multi-year approach
(Battle and Muszynski 1995). The federal
government also should have put more money
on the table. It could have displaced social
assistance-delivered child benefits within two
years. It also should have committed to rais-
ing the new CCTB to a level high enough to
exceed the previous amount of combined fed-
eral and provincial child benefits paid to
social assistance families.
Social assistance families would have
seen a smaller net increase in child bene-
fits than the working poor, but at least
they would have been a little better off
than before. The idea that one type of ben-
efit was simply replacing another would
have been apparent and easily explained.
The incremental strategy that was adopt-
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of the NCB.
However, even without a real increase
in child benefits for social assistance families,
they will be better off under the NCB than
under the old mix of federal child benefits
and provincial welfare child benefits.
Social assistance is a highly stigmatiz-
ing program prone to overt cuts or steady ero-
sion on the part of the provinces. For example,
a get-tough-on-social-assistance approach was
a prominent part of the Conservative govern-
ment’s election platform in Ontario. It fol-
lowed through in October 1995 with a 21.6
percent cut in social assistance for most recip-
ients. The cuts did not harm the govern-
ment’s political fortunes — indeed they
probably helped. The Ontario Conservatives
— residualists in their philosophy of social
policy — were easily re-elected, unlike the
previous two provincial administrations,
which had raised social assistance rates.
Income-tested social programs, in con-
trast to social assistance, have seen real and
substantial increases in benefit rates for
lower-income recipients, with broad public
support. The CCTB, which was fully indexed
as of 2000, is in a far better position than
social assistance to enjoy further increases in
the coming years. If one is truly worried
about the adequacy of social assistance recip-
ients’ incomes, the best option is to provide a
larger proportion of their incomes out of a
politically popular and expanding program,
such as the CCTB.
It is also essential to remember that
Canada’s welfare population is a dynamic,
ever-changing group. About half of social
assistance recipients leave for the workforce
every year. Under the old system, these recip-
ients lost all of their social assistance-deliv-
ered child benefits, but the CCTB is a
“portable” benefit that accompanies families
no matter what their primary income source
or how often it changes.
No longer will social assistance fami-
lies lose precious income from child benefits
if they move to the workforce. Working poor
families will continue to receive their child
benefits from the federal government even if
they go on welfare or EI. If they improve
their earnings, families will continue to
receive the CCTB — though in a smaller
amount if their income increases far up the
income scale. Moreover, some social assis-
tance families are benefiting from some of the
provincial reinvestments.
Another important advantage is that
social assistance families receive the CCTB
along with the large majority of Canadian
families, and without stigma — in stark con-
trast to needs-tested welfare with its elabo-
rate, intrusive and demeaning administrative
apparatus. Payment of the CCTB (and
provincial income-tested benefits) is auto-
matic and painless, involving little or no con-
tact with government officials and a simple
annual test of income administered through
the income tax system — a mechanism that,
perhaps ironically, is the new instrument of
universality since it now touches virtually all
Canadians, the poor along with the middle
class and the affluent. Many people dislike
paying taxes, but they surely feel no stigma
in doing so —  rather, a sense of “grumbling
inclusion” or “negative solidarity” occasioned
by the legal requirement to comply, whether
they like it or not. More seriously, the CCTB
is an effective instrument for social solidarity.
Elderly benefits. The reform of elderly
benefits, as with child benefits, has created a
progressive distribution of benefits and thus
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However, this change (desirable, in my view)
has been achieved at the expense of horizontal
equity, since middle-income and upper-income
seniors get less than in the past — though the
losses are themselves progressive, hitting the
small group of affluent seniors hardest.
Chart 11 compares the overall distri-
bution of federal elderly benefits in 1985 and
2000 for single seniors (the picture is much
the same for couples). The 1985 benefits con-
sisted of net OAS (i.e., net of federal income
tax payable on the benefit), the GIS and fed-
eral tax savings from the age exemption and
pension income deduction. The current 2000
benefits are net OAS (i.e., benefits after fed-
eral income tax and after the income test on
higher-income recipients), the GIS and fed-
eral income tax savings from the non-refund-
able age credit and pension income credit;
provincial tax savings are excluded because
recent reductions in provincial tax rates
would confuse the issue. The 1985 values are
expressed in constant 2000 dollars.
The previous (1985) elderly benefits
system was progressive at low incomes (up
to $18,000 on the graph) but relatively flat
for all other incomes. The progressivity of
taxable OAS and the steeply income-tested
GIS were offset by the regressive age exemp-
tion and pension income deduction, whose
value increased with the taxpayer’s marginal
tax rate. This pattern scored poorly on the
vertical equity dimension, because pension-
ers with widely differing incomes received
virtually the same amount of elderly bene-
fits. For example, a single senior with
income of just $18,000 got $5,855 in feder-
al benefits — $115 less than the rare senior
with an income of $120,000, or almost
seven times as much.
The new (2000) elderly benefits system
is progressive throughout most of the income
range, though flat above $87,000 in the case
of a single senior. Old Age Security is pro-
gressive by virtue of its taxability and the
income test applied for affluent seniors; the
sharply income-tested GIS also is progressive.
The income-tested age credit’s distribution-
al pattern is imperfectly progressive, in that
it shows an up-flat-down pattern (it phases
in between about $12,000 and $15,000,
remains at that maximum amount until
$26,000 and then declines to phase out by
around $50,000). The pension income cred-
it pays the same small benefit to almost all
seniors with some private pension income
(excluding the poorest, who are below the
taxpaying threshold). Once OAS phases out
at $87,000, the only benefit remaining is the
non-refundable pension income credit, which
effectively maintains a token universality to
the system.
Comparing the old and new systems’
distribution of benefits, it is clear that the
increase in vertical equity was achieved at the
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provincial governments. While the new sys-
tem pays no more to poor seniors, it pays
substantially less to middle- and upper-
income pensioners, though — as with child
benefits — the losses are progressive
throughout most of the income range.
The failure of the Seniors Benefit
reform means that elderly benefits —
unlike child benefits — still suffer a form
of horizontal inequity. Couples with the
same total income receive different
amounts of elderly benefits depending on
the mix of spouses’ income (from the CPP,
private pensions, employment and other
sources), because of the use of different
income tests — individual income tests for
OAS and the age credit, a family income
test for the GIS. As a result, “one-income
couples” (i.e., elderly couples in which one
spouse has most or all of the non-OAS/GIS
income) get more benefits than “two-
income couples” (i.e., couples in which
both spouses have significant amounts of
non-OAS/GIS income) at the lower and
upper ends of the income spectrum.
Throughout most of the income range,
two-income couples get more elderly ben-
efits than one-income couples. The Seniors
Benefit would have corrected this horizon-
tal inequity because it would have used
family income rather than the current oil-




One of the perennial aims of reform is
to reduce the complexity of Canada’s social
programs, a complexity that results from sev-
eral factors — for example, delivery by all
three levels of government and by the pub-
lic, private and voluntary sectors; different
and sometimes competing objectives and
associated designs; and administration by
individual programs versus by the income tax
system. There are concerns that scarce
resources are being wasted by duplication
and overlap, and that consumers find it dif-
ficult to understand what benefits are avail-
able and from whom.
The 1980s and 1990s saw some success
in rationalizing the income security system,
though I doubt that Canadians have any bet-
ter grasp of who delivers what. Indeed, a per-
haps inevitable fallout of reform — whether
intended or accidental — is that it tends to
confuse people even more.
The NCB set as one of its objectives
the reduction of overlap and duplication, and
child benefit reform has delivered reasonably
well so far. Even before the NCB, Ottawa
made a series of changes that simplified and
rationalized its system of child benefits.
Three programs (Family Allowances, the
children’s tax exemption and the refundable
child tax credit), with differing designs and
a resulting irrational distribution overall,
producing inherent vertical and horizontal
inequities, were replaced by a single, family
income-tested CTB that achieves horizontal
and vertical equity. Under the NCB, the fed-
eral government further simplified its pro-
gram by doing away with the Working
Income Supplement for the working poor,
resulting in the same maximum payment to
all low-income families with children.
Moreover, administrative efficiencies and sav-
ings have been achieved through the new
provincial income-tested child benefits
typically being administered on behalf of
the provinces by the federal government,
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NCB also has resulted in administrative data-
sharing by the two levels of government.
On the other hand, the fiscal impera-
tive to focus increased spending on rational-
izing and improving child benefits for poor
families led to a complex and virtually
incomprehensible two-tier design of the
CCTB, confusingly labelled the “base Child
Tax Benefit” (i.e., the old CTB, with its low
reduction rate, wide reach and gradual
decline in benefits as incomes increase above
a threshold) and the “National Child Benefit
Supplement” (with a different threshold and
higher reduction rates required to target the
increased spending on low-income families).
To confuse matters further, the changes have
been gradually phased in, with numerous
changes to benefits, thresholds and reduction
rates. Whether all this makes any difference
to families themselves is a good question,
since the CCTB (like its predecessor, the
CTB) is calculated automatically for them
through the income tax machinery. (I return
to this issue in the discussion of disincen-
tives.) When Michael Mendelson and I inter-
viewed a group of working poor families
receiving the new income-tested BC Family
Bonus, some confused the provincial initia-
tive with the old (and extinct) federal baby
bonus — an understandable confusion,
though one that would perturb the British
Columbia government, which want to obtain
public credit for its reform effort (and cost).
The displacement of provincial social
assistance benefits on behalf of children by
increased federal child benefits doubtless has
sown some confusion among welfare families
and fuelled the nonsensical allegation from
some critics and journalists that the CCTB
does not go to welfare families. If, in fact,
some provinces have offset welfare benefits
by more than the increase in federal pay-
ments, then they are breaking the NCB
agreement negotiated between the federal
and provincial governments: I know of no
such proof that this practice has occurred, but
the issue must be carefully monitored and
assessed by the ongoing evaluation of the
reform. Nevertheless, the very fact that the
NCB is attempting to make deep structural
changes in both federal and provincial sys-
tems of child benefits — in the interests of
building a simpler, fairer and more rational
system — is bound to result in some confu-
sion, if only because the old system was so
irrational and hard to explain and the proof
of reform is in the new pudding.
Under the NCB reinvestment agree-
ment, provinces are allowed to reduce their
welfare expenditures on children provided
they allocate the savings to other provincial
programs and services for low-income fam-
ilies with children, such as child benefits,
earnings supplements, early childhood
development and the extension of supple-
mentary health benefits. The same reinvest-
ment process applies to Aboriginal
communities on reserves. Some critics have
complained that the reinvestment agree-
ment allows the provinces too much leeway
in deciding how to reinvest their welfare
savings and thus contributes to a more vari-
able, more complex and less coherent
“national” system of supports for families.
Defenders of the reinvestment agreement
counter that such flexibility is desirable,
since it allows provinces to develop and
deliver programs based on their own needs,
resources and policy priorities. 
The other notable attempt to rational-
ize and simplify a set of disparate benefits
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would have combined four income security
programs for the elderly — OAS, the GIS,
the age credit and the pension income credit
— into a single income-tested Seniors
Benefit paying its maximum amount to low-
income seniors and a diminishing amount as
incomes increased above a threshold — that
is, a similar structure to single-tier refund-
able credits such as the GST credit, refund-
able child tax credit and CTB (though not
the CCTB, which is two-tiered). Not only
would four programs have been recombined
into one, but the horizontal inequity caused
by an oil-and-water mix of individual
income-tested benefits (OAS, the age credit
and the pension income credit) and family
income-tested benefits (the GIS) would have
been resolved by moving to a single, family
income test. However, Ottawa withdrew the
proposal in the face of political opposition
from women’s groups, labour, the NDP and
Bay Street (Canadian Chamber of Commerce;
Slater 1998).
Changes in Social Insurance
Financing: From Pay-Go to
Partial Funding
Canada Pension Plan. One of the
biggest changes in Canadian social policy is
the ongoing shift from pay-go to partial
funding of the CPP. Canada Pension Plan
contributions will increase substantially over
seven years (from 1997 through 2003), but
will level off once they achieve the so-called
“steady-state” rate of 9.9 percent of contrib-
utory earnings (divided equally between
employees and employers) — with no
increases thereafter. Contributions will
exceed expenditures, thus building up a fund
that is being invested in the market in a
diversified portfolio of assets, following the
practice of large employer pension funds in
Canada and other countries. Earnings on the
investments are intended to help reduce
future contribution rates over what they oth-
erwise would be.
The other financing change to the
CPP is a freeze of the Year’s Basic
Exemption, which until now has been
indexed to wages. In 1997, the YBE was
$3,500, calculated as 10 percent of the
$35,800 Year’s Maximum Pensionable
Earnings (the YMPE will remain wage-
indexed). By freezing the YBE, which will
fall in value each year, the base of contribu-
tory earnings will increase (i.e., more earn-
ings will be subject to CPP contributions),
and thus future contribution rates can be
lower than otherwise necessary. The Caledon
Institute calculated that the $3,500 YBE
will be worth $2,722 in 2003 and $822 in
2030 (in constant 1997 dollars). The federal
government has estimated that, by freezing
the YBE, by 2030 the (pay-go) rate would
be reduced by 1.63 percentage points.
Freezing the YBE — a stealthy change
that few Canadians will recognize or under-
stand — proved irresistible to governments
concerned about reducing future contribu-
tion rates. By comparison, the rapid ramp-up
in contributions over the next few years will
be very visible and might prove to be some-
what more difficult politically, partially off-
setting income tax reductions.
The YBE offers (“offered” is a more
accurate term, since it will decline in future)
two advantages to contributors with below-
average earnings. First, it reduces their con-
tributory burden because the first $3,500 of
earnings are exempt. Second, retirement pen-
sions are calculated on the full range of earn-
217
Relentless Incrementalism: Deconstructing and 
Reconstructing Canadian Income Security Policy
Battle.qxd  24/05/01  9:44 AM  Page 217ings up to the YMPE, not the narrower band
of earnings (between the YBE and the
YMPE) on which contributions are paid. As
a result, Canadians who earn below the aver-
age wage receive relatively more CPP retire-
ment benefits in relation to their
contributions than those who earn the aver-
age wage or higher.
Contributors to the CPP can claim a
non-refundable tax credit (calculated as 16
percent of the amount they contribute) to
ease the burden of their contributions.
Adding in provincial income tax savings,
which vary from one province to another, on
average the CPP tax credit is worth about 24
percent of contributions.
The move to partial funding and the
freeze on the YBE will impose a heavier bur-
den on Canadians with below-average earn-
ings than on those in the higher
($50,000-and-up) range. For example, a
$20,000 employee’s net (i.e., after-tax cred-
it) contributions will rise from $337 or 1.7
percent of earnings in 1996 to $625 or 3.1
percent of earnings in 2003, the year that the
steady-state rate will be reached. A $50,000
employee’s net contributions will increase
from $652 or 1.3 percent of earnings in 1996
to $1,181 or 2.4 percent of earnings in 2003.
(All dollar figures are in inflation-adjusted
1996 amounts.)
Measuring the net increase in contri-
butions (2003 versus 1996) as a percentage
of earnings, the result ranges from a high of
1.6 percent for those earning just $6,000 to
1.5 percent for those earning $35,000
(roughly average earnings) and then declines
with increasing income to just 0.5 percent
of earnings for employees earning
$100,000. The distributional pattern is
identical for the self-employed — a grow-
ing group in the labour force — except that
their increased burden is double that of
employees. However, the 2000 federal
budget announced that the self-employed
will be able to deduct the “employers” share
of CPP contributions fully from taxable
income, putting them on an even playing
field (after tax) with employees with respect
to CPP contributions.
Women and younger workers will be
hardest hit in relative terms during the
seven-year transition to partial funding,
since they cluster at the lower end of the
earnings spectrum. Among female CPP
contributors, 79 percent earn less than the
YMPE (i.e., about the average) and 43 per-
cent earn less than half the average. The
large majority of young contributors earn
below the average.
On the other hand, Canadians with low
or modest employment earnings stand to ben-
efit most in the longer term from the financ-
ing changes. The steady-state contribution
rate will reach 9.9 percent in 2003, and then is
supposed to remain level, whereas the pay-go
rate would have kept increasing. After 2016,
the pay-go rate would exceed the partial fund-
ing rate and rise year after year.
Moreover, partial funding is intended
to restore public confidence in the long-term
viability of the CPP — a pension program
that is crucial to low- and modest-income
Canadians, who rarely work for employers
offering private pension plans or save much,
if anything, in individual retirement savings
plans. The growth of a CPP fund that will
be invested broadly in the market should
appeal to the many Canadians who either do
not understand or do not accept the pay-go
system in which there was nothing more
than a small contingency reserve. The baby
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for part of its own pensions and generations
X, Y and Z will pay lower contributions
than they would under the old (pay-go) sys-
tem, which should to some extent address
the issue of the CPP’s alleged intergenera-
tional unfairness.
Unemployment Insurance. Canada’s other
major social insurance program, U/EI, also
has gone the partial financing route in reali-
ty, though the change was not formally
acknowledged as such. Although premiums
have been lowered several times in recent
years, they still have been set higher than
required to pay current benefits and weather
the cost-boosting impact of a recession; in
1999, the EI surplus was a staggering $26
billion. Despite recurrent complaints from
social groups, labour and business lobbies
and the Auditor General, the Liberals have
maintained the EI surplus because it was an
important weapon in the war against the
deficit (it is counted as revenue) and remains
a key tax in the post-deficit period — espe-
cially when income taxes are being substan-
tially reduced.
As is the case with the CPP, the
financing changes to EI are regressive. The
Maximum Insurable Earnings (MIE)
declined first because of its overt reduction
and then steadily until 2000 by “stealth,”
through lack of indexation to the change in
the average wage. A lower MIE narrows the
earnings base upon which premiums are
levied, requiring a higher premium rate
that falls heaviest on low-wage workers.
And EI premiums are now collected on the
first hour of employment. Overall, more of
the EI premium burden has shifted from
middle- and upper-income earners to lower-
wage earners and those in unstable jobs.
Changing Division of Labour in
Social Policy
Several of the changes discussed in this
paper have affected the division of labour and
the federal-provincial balance in social poli-
cy. But the widespread notion that Ottawa is
passing the buck to the provinces in an era of
devolution and rising provincial power is
another case of “conventional wisdom” being
simplistic if not more wrong than right.
Rumours of the demise of Ottawa’s role
in social policy are greatly exaggerated. Yes,
the federal government slashed its social
transfers to the provinces during the anti-
deficit campaign, and the cash/tax point
transfer formula means that federal cash pay-
ments will continue to decline in future —
but Ottawa since has begun to partially
restore past losses by putting billions back
into the Canada Health and Social Transfer
(mainly for health, with a bit for early child-
hood development). Yes, replacing the
Canada Assistance Plan with the CHST effec-
tively withdrew federal funding for provin-
cial welfare and social services (since the
CHST for all effective purposes is a CHT),
but the NCB is levering some federal financ-
ing for provincial social spending. Yes, the
demise of the CAP has cut all but one feder-
al string on provincial welfare programming
(the requirements for appeal systems, a safe-
ty net available to all persons in need and cer-
tain basic program information to the federal
government are gone, with only the porta-
bility requirement remaining), but the alle-
gation of social advocates that the CHST has
put an end to “national standards” in provin-
cial social programs and medicare is based on
the nostalgic myth that Ottawa enforced
national “standards” before the CHST: it did
not, because the conditions of the CAP and
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of standards (Torjman and Battle 1995). Yes,
Ottawa has largely pulled out of social hous-
ing, but it appears to be reassessing this deci-
sion in the face of pressure to help deal with
the national problem of lack of affordable
housing. The one devolutionary act that the
federal government appears not to have
regretted or had second thoughts about is the
devolution of most labour market programs
to the provinces.
The NCB has increased the federal
role in child benefits and diminished that of
the provinces, enabling them to spend more
on family services under the reinvestment
agreement. Ottawa’s expenditures on
income security will continue to expand
significantly well into this century by virtue
of the combination of an aging population
(soon to become swollen by the baby
boomer generation) and fully indexed pub-
lic pensions (elderly benefits and the CPP).
The restoration of full indexation of the fed-
eral tax/transfer system, contrasted to the
non-indexation of provincial income securi-
ty programs, also is serving to help shift the
federal-provincial balance in income securi-
ty policy. Another factor in the changing
balance is that the provinces are spending
more on rising health costs — exacerbated
by diminishing federal cash transfer pay-
ments — and less on social assistance. Thus
what I see as a sensible division of labour —
a dominant (though probably never exclu-
sive) federal role in income security and
provincial role in health and social services
— is making some progress.
The NCB holds out the promise of
more than just a restructuring and enhance-
ment of child benefits. By removing a large
group (children) from social assistance case-
loads, it marks a major step forward in the
essential task of dismantling the welfare sys-
tem and replacing it with more effective pro-
grams. The aim should be to transform adult
social assistance from its current conception
as a last-resort income support program. It
should be modernized in the form of a public
wage for adults, more suitable to an “active”
income security system, combined with a
decent income support system for people
unable to work for pay.
The next big steps in this evolution
should be a fundamental restructuring of
income support for non-elderly adults, with a
larger federal presence (through a combina-
tion of financing and delivery) to replace
most of provincial social assistance and rele-
gate welfare to the truly residual role it orig-
inally was intended to serve (Battle, Torjman
and Mendelson 2000; Torjman 1998).
The Contentious Issue of
Disincentives: Of Welfare Walls
and Marginal Tax Rage
The NCB’s chief rationale is to lower
that part of the “welfare wall” unwittingly
caused by a discriminatory system of child
benefits. One of the disincentives to moving
from welfare to the workforce is the fact that
parents have to forfeit thousands of dollars in
cash benefits (social assistance benefits on
behalf of children) as well as in-kind benefits
(e.g., supplementary health care from wel-
fare) at the very time that they are trying to
establish themselves in employment (typi-
cally low-paid), which brings substantial
costs of its own in the form of income and
payroll taxes and work-related expenses.
Clearly there is more to the welfare wall than
differential child benefits: other barriers
include lack of affordable housing and qual-
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pay a living wage. Nonetheless, the old two-
tiered system of child benefits formed a sig-
nificant part of the welfare wall, and the
NCB is attempting a structural remedy to
this problem. Moreover, the largest expendi-
ture of provincial reinvestments under the
NCB is on child care.
While the right appears to buy into
the welfare wall argument, which is to be
expected given its longstanding concern to
root out social program-caused disincentives
to work, some economists just cannot stop
themselves from tilting at the windmill of
the NCB’s alleged labour market disincen-
tive caused by its impact on marginal tax
rates (Poschmann 1999; Sayeed 1999). They
argue that the NCB reform could be defeat-
ing its own purpose by imposing high effec-
tive marginal tax rates. These supposedly
discourage the work ethic of the very fami-
lies it is intended to help. (By “effective mar-
ginal tax rate” we mean the percentage of
additional income paid in income and pay-
roll taxes or forgone due to the reduction
rates of income-tested programs.)
The Canada Child Tax Benefit has
resulted in higher marginal tax rates for some
working poor families because of the wish to
target limited new spending on low-income
families. (Families in the $21,000-$30,000
net family income range have been affected.)
For example, an Ontario family with net
income of $27,000 saw its effective margin-
al tax rate rise from 39.5 to 54.2 percent as
a result of the high reduction rate imposed
on the National Child Benefit Supplement.
At the same time, recipients of social assis-
tance who moved into the labour market
enjoyed a large reduction in their marginal
tax rates.
The impact of this mix of higher and
lower effective marginal tax rates on labour
market behaviour remains an open question.
The factors that can influence families’ deci-
sions regarding paid work are complex (Battle
and Mendelson 1997). These decisions can-
not simply be taken as given according to the
usual simplistic assumptions of traditional
economic theory. Issues such as social expec-
tations, opportunities, transportation, child
care, workplace policies and many other fac-
tors fit into the equation. It is not clear, nor
does economic theory suggest, that the effec-
tive marginal tax rate is the most important
of these variables.
The NCB has objectives beyond the
labour market, unlike “pure” income sup-
plements for the working poor. The new
child benefit’s impact on the depth of pover-
ty and disposable income is equally —
indeed, more — important than its effect on
labour market behaviour.
The Expanding Role of the
Income Tax System in Social
Policy
The important role of the income tax
system has cropped up repeatedly in this
essay on major changes to income security
policy. Income security and the tax system
have become very much intertwined, as evi-
denced by analysts’ common use of the term
“tax/transfer system.” A brief review of the
positive and negative impact of this major
social policy development is merited.
Partial de-indexation of the personal
income tax system eroded the after-tax value
of income benefits that are taxable (e.g.,
OAS, Family Allowances, EI and CPP retire-
ment, disability, survivor and death benefits).
Partial de-indexation of the rates of refund-
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ing the GST credit and CTB, both corroded
benefits and reduced their coverage. Also, the
slow drip of de-indexation corroded the value
of the numerous other social benefits delivered
through the income tax system in the form
of non-refundable tax credits — for example,
the age credit, spousal and spousal equivalent
credits, disability credit, tuition and educa-
tion credits and pension income credit.
Another, perhaps more conventional, way of
expressing the same thing is that partial de-
indexation of non-refundable credits con-
tributed (along with partial de-indexation of
tax thresholds) to federal and provincial
income tax increases that offset improve-
ments to a few social programs and exacer-
bated cuts to others.
On a positive front, Canada’s trend to
tax-delivered income-tested programs is one
of its major social policy accomplishments.
The personal income tax system is an effi-
cient and inclusiveness-enhancing vehicle
for delivering important income-tested pro-
grams such as federal and provincial child
benefits and refundable tax credits. In sharp
contrast to needs-tested social assistance,
tax-delivered benefits are seen to be objec-
tive, administratively simple, fair and non-
stigmatizing. Eligibility can be established
easily through the income tax form; there
are no decisions made on the basis of a
detailed assessment of personal circum-
stances; there is little or no contact between
recipients and government officials; unlike
needs-tested welfare, there is no risk of
unfair treatment resulting from administra-
tive discretion. Once eligibility is estab-
lished, payments can be triggered
automatically by computer. Enhancements
to the federal CCTB and refundable GST
credit are a substantive way of achieving the
national standards so beloved of universal-
ists: benefits are delivered on a consistent
and reliable basis throughout the country
and have a built-in equalization effect.
Accountability
Making public expenditures more
“accountable” is another strong theme in cur-
rent Canadian policy-making in such areas as
child benefits, health care and early child-
hood development. Methods include regular
public reporting, emphasis on measuring
“outcomes” and not just inputs, documenta-
tion and dissemination of “best practices,”
and the renewed use of social experimenta-
tion exemplified by the promising self-suffi-
ciency projects under way in New Brunswick
and British Columbia. New public spending
is now labelled “investment” rather than
expenditure, implying that such outlays
eventually will reap “profits” (e.g., in terms
of increased productivity of the workforce
and resulting lower reliance on income sup-
port and increasing tax revenue) and thus are
cost effective.
The enthusiasm for evidence-based
reform stems not only from a (somewhat
simplistic and naive, in my view) faith in
the capacity of research and evaluation to
tell us what works and what does not, and
for the latter to furnish a sufficient basis for
effective policy, but also in the blunt reality
that public accountability is one of the few
levers left to Ottawa vis-à-vis the provinces
in the brave new world of the Social Union
Framework Agreement and partnership fed-
eralism. A prime case in point is the recent
early childhood development agreement,
which transfers federal funds to the
provinces with virtually no federal say over
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supposed to go to any, some or all of four
areas broadly defined: healthy pregnancy,
birth and infancy; parenting and family
supports; early childhood development,
learning and care; and community supports
for families with children. The provinces are
free to decide what to do in any or all of
these four areas, though their investments
should be “incremental” (i.e., not use new
federal funds to pay for what they would
have done or are doing on their own).
The agreement (whose brevity is
telling) stresses the need for public report-
ing on expenditures and activities for pur-
poses of accountability, policy evaluation
and development (including annual report-
ing, developing a shared national framework
including comparable program and outcome
indicators, and sharing research and infor-
mation on best practices). However, such
information, though useful to both levels of
government and to non-governmental play-
ers, will not constitute part of any condi-
tional assessment of whether the provinces
should continue to receive federal funding:
the days of conditional federalism are all but
gone (the notable exception being federal
enforcement of the conditions attached to
the Canada Health Act, though the federal
teeth are not particularly sharp and bite but
rarely). Ottawa has neither the will nor the
guile to restore conditionality of its social
transfers by means of stealth. So too do the
provinces have carte blanche on how they
reinvest their welfare savings under the
NCB, so long as it helps low-income fami-
lies with children. Social groups as well as
governments can use such data and infor-
mation to monitor and assess the develop-
ment of the NCB.
The Politics of Social Policy
Reform: Relentless
Incrementalism
The numerous changes proposed or put
in place by the federal and provincial gov-
ernments have sparked ample criticisms,
mainly from social advocacy groups, well-
publicized by a media generally keen to crit-
icize government and (with a few exceptions)
blissfully ignorant of the substance of social
policy. Yet governments generally have had
an easy ride on the road to reform, stumbling
only a couple of times. The only noteworthy
social policy pratfalls that come to my mind
are the Conservatives’ botched attempt at
partially de-indexing OAS benefits (in which
the diminutive, near-senior famous-for-15
minutes Solange Denis played a key part,
much to the discomfort of Prime Minister
“Charlie Brown” Mulroney) and the Liberals’
retreat on its proposal for a Seniors Benefit
(when the Liberals trotted out a now-sup-
portive Madame Denis for another 10 min-
utes of fame, though to no avail).
There are doubtless a variety of factors
at play in the politics of social policy reform,
but I will mention four here — the anti-
deficit campaign, the popular appeal of a
post-welfare state model of social policy, gov-
ernments’ use of strategies of what I have
dubbed “policy change by stealth” and
“relentless incrementalism” and the advan-
tage of majority governments with weak
oppositions.
The Conservatives faltered briefly at
the start of their first term with the proposal
to partially de-index OAS, but they went on
to make a variety of changes to social pro-
grams that cut costs and changes to the tax
system that increased revenues. The Liberals
carried on the Tories’ program of reform on
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ledger and finally made real progress against
the deficit. Whether they accepted the need
to restrain spending and pay more taxes in a
grudging or enthusiastic manner, the
Canadian electorate generally came to accept
the need for tough medicine to fight the
deficit and accumulating debt. Without the
success of the anti-deficit campaign, govern-
ments never would have embarked on what
became such ambitious and far-reaching
reforms to social policy.
I also think that social advocates’ faith
in the power of the “sacred trust” of the uni-
versalist welfare state to withstand change
proved to be naive. While the politics of
stealth doubtless served to mute public crit-
icism, as argued below, I would argue that
substantial numbers of Canadians are recep-
tive to criticisms of the weaknesses (e.g., with
respect to irrational distribution of benefits,
disincentives and sustainability) of major
social programs and supportive of some of
the changes so vociferously opposed by the
critics and put forward in what I call the
“post-welfare state” model of social security.
Universality of child and elderly benefits
died not with a bang but a whimper: it is
revealing that most people polled in 1990
(when OAS and Family Allowances were in
the process of being income-tested, though
Ottawa pretended otherwise) supported a for-
the-poor-only child benefit and that public
support for universal old age pensions
(though stronger than for universal child
benefits) was weakest among the elderly. The
Tories proved that the universalist welfare
state was no longer sacred, if in fact it ever
had been. As noted earlier, polling during the
Liberals’ Social Security Review found that
most Canadians believe that social programs
require substantial change. Indeed, the con-
servative critique of welfare and UI always
has echoed loudly in popular distaste for
“pogey” and “the dole.” Witness the Ontario
Conservative government’s politically suc-
cessful demonization of welfare in the elec-
tion campaign that brought it to power and
its immediate slashing of welfare rates to
show it meant business.
I and others have argued repeatedly
since my 1990 essay Social Policy by Stealth
that governments’ success in imposing many
of their changes stemmed from the use of
arcane technical amendments (partial de-
indexation being the chief example) that are
poorly understood by the public and critics
(Battle 1990; Prince 1999). Major changes
to important social programs, such as the
removal of universal old age pensions and
family allowances, the massive cuts in social
transfer payments to the provinces and the
transformation of child benefits, were imple-
mented by stealth with no advance notice
and little effective public debate. So also did
the federal finance department harness the
power of inflation to impose hidden annual
income tax hikes from 1986 through 1999.
The Liberals left intact the Tories’ machinery
of stealth and used it to their fiscal advantage
— restoring full indexation in 2000 only
when the deficit was wrestled to the ground.
But stealth still operates in certain aspects of
social policy — for example, non-indexation
of provincial welfare and other income secu-
rity rates, the decline in federal cash transfer
payments, freezing the Year’s Basic
Exemption in the CPP and EI’s maximum
insurable earnings level.
Policy change by stealth is a successful
example of a style of reform that I have
dubbed “relentless incrementalism.” Relent-
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reforms, seemingly small and discrete when
made, that accumulate to become more than
the sum of their parts. Relentless incremen-
talism is purposeful and patterned, not hap-
hazard and unintended. The drip drip drip of
individual changes over time carve substan-
tial and planned shifts in the structure and
objectives of public policy.
Relentless incrementalism can be
benign or malignant, depending on the view
of the beholder. Partial de-indexation of the
personal income tax system and federal child
benefits had an overall regressive impact and
was undemocratic — perhaps a more apt
term in this application is relentless decre-
mentalism — but did serve the “higher pur-
pose” of helping quell the deficit by
increasing income tax revenue and reducing
child benefits expenditures. The 60-year his-
tory of U/EI is one of expansion and then
contraction, mostly through incremental
changes to a scheme as complex and impen-
etrable as welfare. One’s opinion of the merit
of these changes depends upon whether one
buys into the conservative critique of UI
being part of the problem rather than part of
the solution. Elderly benefits were funda-
mentally changed through a series of seem-
ingly small steps, though the logical leap —
to an integrated, family income-tested
Seniors Benefit — did not succeed, perhaps
because for once Ottawa did rely upon its
well-proven strategy of incrementalism, but
instead painted the proposal as a radical
architectural shift and sold it as an entirely
new program: might the same result have
been achieved through stealth (i.e., by fami-
ly income-testing OAS and the age and pen-
sion income credits)? The answer is yes in the
design sense (the Seniors Benefit essentially
mimicked the current layering of the GIS on
top of OAS), but no in the political sense
because I doubt that a back-door approach
would have muted the attacks from the right
and the left; to the contrary, they could have
cried “stealth.”
Relentless incrementalism remains the
dominant mode of reform, in part because of
the failure of past efforts at big-bang reforms.
Tax benefits for persons with disabilities are
being quietly improved through small
changes that have gone largely unnoticed. In
sharp contrast to the federal restoration of
indexation of the personal income tax system
and CCTB, the provincial and territorial gov-
ernments continue to shave spending on wel-
fare and even their new income-tested child
benefits and earnings supplements through
the mechanism of non-indexation.
Of course, at times there are larger leaps
— for example, the addition of entirely new
programs during the expansion phase of the
welfare state, the NCB’s complementary
increase in federal child benefits and dis-
placement and reallocation of provincial wel-
fare spending on children, the shift from
pay-go to partial funding of the CPP — that
mark a more fundamental change in structure
that many observers would not characterize as
incremental — though, again, the judgement
as to what is incremental and what is more
radical is always open to debate. Still, at least
in the current reformation stage of the
Canadian welfare state, I think that even such
deeper, structural changes are for the most
part being implemented through a sort of
“politics of incrementalism” that typically
introduces changes amongst a raft of other
measures in annual budgets and eschews the
“grand new design” spin that has backfired in
the past (e.g., the Seniors Benefit).
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more mundane but powerful advantage the
Mulroney government had going for it: an
electoral majority, which meant it did not
need to compromise on its social policy
changes. The Chrétien government has had
it even better, with the decimation of the fed-
eral Conservatives and the lack of an effective
opposition. The only real opposition to the
ruling Liberals has come from their own cau-
cus, some members of which are uncomfort-
able with the party’s perceived shift to the
right: the retreat on the Seniors Benefit —
announced in the midsummer doldrums —
had much to do with the Finance Minister’s
case of cold feet when members of the
women’s caucus (inspired by hysterical criti-
cism from women’s groups) dumped ice
water on the proposed reform.
Civil Society and Social Policy
Reform
Not surprisingly, recent and ongoing
changes to Canada’s social security system
have proved to be controversial. Social advo-
cates generally have been highly critical of
most of the changes, arguing that they have
imposed hardship on lower-income
Canadians who bore an unfair burden of the
war against the deficit and have failed to
share equally in the new-found bounty of
the surplus. The much ballyhooed (and
much misconstrued) assault on universality
is seen as undermining the broad societal
consensus required to maintain support for
the welfare state overall, including pro-
grams targeted to the poor. The federal
Liberal government’s “mixed” strategy of
allocating the “fiscal dividend” of the sur-
plus among tax cuts, debt repayment and
social spending has been criticized from the
left for in effect fiddling while Rome burns
— for bestowing broad-based income tax
cuts that include the wealthy while failing
to spend enough on persistent, debilitating
problems like poverty, homelessness and
chronic unemployment.
Policy changes reducing entitlement
to EI, the CPP disability benefit and work-
ers’ compensation have been criticized, and
not just from the perspective of potential
beneficiaries who receive lower entitlements
or nothing at all. The changes also break the
traditional link between premiums and
entitlement, weakening the “social contract”
that maintains public support of social
insurances. Public confidence in EI has been
shaken by the fact that just over one third
of unemployed workers in Canada current-
ly receive benefits under the program.
Critics contend that workers — especially
those in provinces west of Quebec, which
have a low rate of EI coverage — are not
getting what they are paying for: they pay
into the program when they are working,
but most get nothing in return when they
become unemployed. And while the financ-
ing changes to the CPP will secure the
future of this vital social insurance program,
these reforms are not widely understood and
many Canadians — especially the young —
continue to fear that the program “will not
be there” for them when they retire.
The reform of child benefits has proven
particularly contentious. The anger of wel-
fare advocates at the NCB for not delivering
net improvements in child benefits for wel-
fare families is understandable in the light of
years of overt and/or covert cuts to social
assistance benefits on the part of the
provinces and their distrust of governments
bearing “reforms” that are simply code for
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to address, let alone debate, the policy case
for the restructuring of child benefits and its
potential extension to badly needed reform
of income and service support for non-elder-
ly Canadians (welfare, UI and employment
programs) generally. Critics from the right
also have taken a narrow view of child bene-
fit reform in their obsession with the bogey-
man of marginal tax rates.
However, despite vocal and energetic
criticism from the non-governmental sector,
almost none of these social policy changes
have been successfully opposed. The promi-
nent exception is the failed effort at the
Seniors Benefit, which provoked a firestorm
of criticism from left and right that got to
the Liberal caucus and thus contributed to
the Finance Minister’s decision to withdraw
his proposal as not worth the risk to his gov-
ernment and to his own political future.
Most of the arguments against the Seniors
Benefit had little substantive merit and some
were downright lies, such as the contention
that the proposal would turn the old age pen-
sion into a welfare program and would
reduce benefits for poor women. But percep-
tion (more to the point, deception) is what so
often counts in politics — especially when it
comes to public pensions and government’s
fear of grey power. The fiscal calculus also
played a role in the Seniors Benefit’s politi-
cal demise: the original proposal would have
produced virtually no immediate savings and
only modest downstream economies (20 years
off, a couple of eternities in political time),
and the amended design being worked on
just before Ottawa pulled the plug (with its
lower reduction rate and larger benefit
increase for the poor) would have had even
less fiscal payoff.
CONCLUSION
Economic factors always have played a
defining role in Canada’s social security sys-
tem, and are more powerful than ever as the
universalist welfare state gives way to a post-
welfare state. The slowdown of economic
growth and rise of inflation in the mid-1970s
brought the window down on the massive
post-war expansion of social programs.
Deepening deficits in the 1980s and 1990s
spurred governments — especially Ottawa
— to impose gradual but cumulatively major
and in some cases radical changes on virtual-
ly all areas of Canadian social policy through
the politics of “relentless incrementalism.”
Social and demographic forces are placing
heavy cost and performance demands on
social programs, and the changing nature of
federalism both affects and reflects the trans-
formation of our social security system.
Despite opposition from social advoca-
cy groups, the emerging post-welfare state
model and the structural reforms it calls for
will better serve Canada’s evolving economy,
society and polity than nostalgia for a uni-
versalist welfare state that never worked all
that well.
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